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 Uncertainty in revenue for grain and oilseed operations located across Nebraska 
exists due to commodity price volatility and yield variability.  Several risk management 
tools enable producers to deal with financial losses from revenue declines including crop 
insurance, marketing strategies, and government farm programs.  Producers may need to 
combine multiple tools for an effective risk management strategy, but research lacks on 
integrating these tools currently available to producers across the state.  Actions amongst 
individuals actively engaged in the industry show their plans to deal with revenue 
declines may lead to less than optimal strategies.     
 Stochastic simulation utilizing eight representative farms across Nebraska allows 
for the analysis of risk management strategies.  Attributes of these farms reflect the 
average size, productivity, and variability, expressed by operations across the eight 
National Agricultural Statistical Districts of the state.  Also, the simulation of national, 
state, district, and county yields or prices are generated for the necessary parameters in 
the evaluation of various programs or products.     
 Conclusion drawn from these simulations indicate the optimal risk management 
strategy for a region of Nebraska, given a set of feasible prices and base 2011 yield and 
  
price parameters.  Current program participation and product utilization rates indicate 
strategies employed by the majority of producers in the state do not sway far from these 
simulated outcomes.  Participating in higher levels of revenue protection crop insurance, 
direct and counter-cyclical government programs, and using a short futures hedge when 
marketing grain provided the greatest level of revenue protection subject to a producer’s 
risk preference.  Findings may change substantially dependent upon different price, yield, 
or guarantee levels.        
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Nebraska’s geography, topography, soils and climate influence the scope and 
variety of cropping systems.  Due to climatic variability and volatile commodity markets, 
farm-level crop revenue varies with these conditions.  An assortment of revenue and price 
safety nets may reduce financial losses for those participating in federal farm programs.  
In addition, producers may choose from multiple crop insurance and marketing strategies 
to help manage risk.  The complexity of these risk management alternatives often leave 
producers overwhelmed and may lead to less-than optimal decision making.     
1.1 Motivation 
 As a leader in grain and oilseed production, Nebraska farm operations raised 
approximately 1.5 billion bushels of corn, 267 million bushels of soybeans, and 64 
million bushels of winter wheat in 2010 (Nebraska Department of Agriculture, 2010).  
Farmers across Nebraska contribute a substantial share of commodity supplies feeding 
national demand for livestock feeds, renewable energy, exports, and other uses.  While 
these multiple demands allow for numerous avenues to market grain and oilseed 
commodities, individual producers still face sizeable risk in crop revenue during the 
production process.   
 In each production cycle, crop producers raising grains and oilseeds make large 
monetary investments to raise commodities with an uncertain return.  Depending upon an 
operation’s financial situation, capital may be constrained for a period exceeding 12 to 18 
months.  Expenses vary depending upon the production techniques and location in 
Nebraska, with crop revenue being the product of both yield and price.  The types of 
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revenue losses may be either classified as shallow or deep on which the farm specific 
(idiosyncratic) and large scale (systemic) losses influence crop revenue (Zulauf, 2011).  
These two factors implicitly feed into a producer’s decision making based upon their risk 
tolerance and financial condition.   
 Environmental factors unique to the farm lead to idiosyncratic risk, whereas 
regional weather events such as drought or national price declines contribute to systemic 
risk.  These factors play a role in the performance of various programs or products 
designed to reduce the effects of losses in yield or price.  Historically farm-level yield 
shocks deviate randomly from trend projections.  Commodity price volatility increased in 
recent years along with record high crop prices.  For example, corn prices prior to 2006 
averaged around $2.00 per bushel with a deviation of $0.50.  With the advent of a nearly 
two- to three-fold increase in values, the volatility of prices have followed suit.  Similar 
trends can be observed in both the soybean and wheat markets (Hailu & Weersink, 2011).   
 To deal with these revenue risks, grain producers have a variety of price- and/or 
revenue-based programs available.  Using these programs or products simultaneously is a 
challenge due to the complexity and wide variation of productivity factors on individual 
farms.  Relevant government programs include the Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE) Program, the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment (DCP) Program, the 
Marketing Loan (ML) Program, and the Supplemental Revenue Assistance (SURE) 
Program.  Federally-subsidized crop insurance products include Yield Protection (YP), 
Revenue Protection (RP), and Revenue Protection with a Harvest Price Exclusion 
(RP-HPE).  Marketing strategies are also important to the discussion including hedging 
with futures, options, or cash-market alternatives.   
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 Lubben and Novak (2010) classified the degree by which these programs or 
products interact to guard against adverse price, revenue, or production movements and 
the correlating levels of farm, area, or national scope.  Intricacies and correlations 
between programs or products generates the necessary motivation for further evaluation 
to gain an understanding the effects these tools have on reducing negative variability of 
crop revenue and ultimately farm revenue generated from commodity sales.  Analyzing 
the influence of production and climatic characteristics across Nebraska and how these 
elements interact will also further demonstrate the value of different strategies used 
across the state.   
 Zulauf (2011) defines even further the level of idiosyncratic and systemic risk 
protection available under each program or product.  From these references, a feasible set 
of alternatives involving government programs, crop insurance and marketing strategies 
may be drawn.  Current research shows individual producer decision makers may focus 
on products or programs with maximum payout anticipations instead of selecting 
combinations achieving optimal risk reduction (Lubben & Novak, 2010).  Analyzing the 
feasible set of alternatives using DCP versus ACRE will explore payouts under each 
strategy.    
 Every crop producer located in the state of Nebraska has different financial, 
production, and risk tolerance or aversion characteristics.  Even in scenarios where an 
individual’s balance sheet has a high level of equity, volatile price and yield movements 
put financial resources at substantial risk.  Beginning or aggressively expanding 
producers with limited resources and objectives may be compromised when losses occur. 
The level of risk may vary across enterprises, but the overall goal remains maximizing 
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net crop revenue subject to risk.  To accomplish this goal, each producer should develop 
a risk management strategy appropriate to his or her needs.       
1.2 Objectives 
 The following research objectives focus on farm-level decision making relative to 
risk management programs and marketing strategies available to Nebraska crop 
producers.  Whether from farm-specific variation in yield or national price declines, 
losses in revenue may be due to elements beyond an individual’s control.  Developing a 
strategy to deal with these challenges allows a producer to cope with potential revenue 
losses.  Due to the complexity of the interaction among alternatives, producers’ 
perception regarding these strategies may lead to less-than-optimal outcomes.  
Understanding how the portfolio of risk management programs and marketing strategies 
interact allows research to broaden the application by producers across different regions 
of the state.  
 The objective of this research includes: 
1) Create a set of eight representative crop farms that display the average size, 
scale, and productivity factors associated with United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service-Agricultural 
Statistical Districts (NASS-ASDs).  From these operations, a stochastic 
simulation will be used to produce yield and price distributions, drawing upon 
historical data and implied variations of individual producers.   
2) Build a comprehensive set of revenue schedules to evaluate the effects of 
government programs ACRE, DCP, and ML; crop insurance products YP, RP, 
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and RP-HPE; and marketing tools including the use of hedging and cash 
market alternatives. 
3) Using the programs or products defined in the revenue schedules, arrange a 
set of risk management tools in order to identify the results of various 
combinations of revenue protection regimes.  
4) Simulate and summarize results to determine the effect of various strategies 
on farm-level crop revenue across different regions of the state showing 
potential variability of the regions.  
 These simulation results will build on other relevant studies.  Other research has 
found, that optimal risk reduction strategy vary across different crops and regions 
(Woodward, Sherrick, & Schnitkey, 2010).  The simulation results will demonstrate the 
effects environmental and climatic features have on crop revenue expectations and the 
optimum risk management strategy within a particular region of Nebraska.  These results 
will help producers to make improved risk management decisions relative to their farm 
and location.  Each producer faces different financial conditions and yield variability.  
Having a representative farm for each region allows producers to compare their farm 
against an operation reflecting the average attributes of an area.         
1.3 Organization  
 The literature review in Chapter 2 discusses tools relevant to the farm including 
programs, policies, and marketing strategies which when integrated, create a producer’s 
risk management portfolio.  Along with understanding the principles of these policies, the 
review will consider previous simulation work as a foundation to develop a crop revenue 
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model for Nebraska. As previous research has primarily focused on individual 
components of the risk management portfolio, combining these tools and focusing 
research efforts to sites specific to Nebraska combines the assumptions necessary to 
analyze different strategies across the state.   
 Based upon the literature review, Chapter 3 discusses the necessary procedures 
and methods to reach the research objectives.  Stochastic simulation of yield and price 
distributions provides the underlying process to generate farm-level crop revenue 
distributions.  Summarized results from individual farm simulations act as the basis for 
discussion in Chapter 4.  Previously outlined risk management scenarios and the overall 
effects of a particular strategy had on a particular farm’s net crop revenue are 
summarized in the results section.  The analysis provides insight on individual 
representative farms, but also across different regions of Nebraska.   
These implications on farms and across districts are highlighted in Chapter 5.  
Insights from the results guide recommendations for future producer decisions, policy 
formation, and research.  This analysis may serve as a basis for the next round of Farm 
Bill discussions.  Budgetary issues may force producers to reconsider risk management 
tool integration given reduced program options or coverage levels.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Revenue risk in crop operations comes from price volatility and yield variability 
caused by market and environmental factors.  Nebraska crop producers face challenges 
when selecting the proper risk management strategy.  Multiple options increase the 
complexity of selecting the right combination of tools.  Previous research has focused on 
individual components of a producer’s risk management portfolio, such as government 
programs, crop insurance products, or marketing tools.  A study of effective risk 
management strategies needs to consider all the components available to producers in 
Nebraska while drawing from results of other relevant studies. 
2.1 Review of Risk Management Alternatives 
 Tools to manage crop revenue risk are regulated and overseen by different 
authorities.  The Federal Government administers federal farm programs and supports the 
delivery of crop insurance products through private insurers.  Marketing strategies may 
be carried out on publicly regulated exchanges or through private market transactions.  
All together these tools help producers protect against losses in yield, price, or revenue.  
In periods of dynamic yield or price shifts the performance of different alternative 
combinations may vary depending upon the focus of the protection.  
 The 2008 Farm Bill reauthorized federal farm programs, including price-based 
programs such as the DCP and ML program along with new revenue base safety nets 
ACRE and SURE (USDA Economic Research Service, 2008).  ACRE protects actual 
revenue on a farm based on actual production, while DCP provides income support tied 
to price paid on historical base acres and program yields.  The ML program or Loan 
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Deficiency Payments (LDPs) effectively provide a minimum price to producers for all 
eligible crops raised in the United States.  The DCP program includes fixed guaranteed 
Direct Payments (DPs) decoupled from production and Counter-Cyclical Payments 
(CCPs) triggered by prices dropping below a specified target price (USDA Farm Service 
Agency, 2008).  The revenue safety net in the ACRE program replaces the CCPs.  When 
producers choose to participate in the ACRE program, the producers opt out of CCPs for 
the revenue safety net and reduce DPs by 20% and ML rates by 30% (USDA Farm 
Service Agency, 2009).  SURE serves as the first legislative language to implement a 
permanent disaster program, but was authorized only through September 31, 2011 
(USDA Farm Service Agency, 2011).  All of these programs base revenue guarantees or 
price protection off of the national marketing year average (MYA) price.    
Crop insurance products administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) include YP, RP, and RP-HPE.  A producer’s Actual Production History (APH) 
serves as the benchmark for these insurance products.  YP offers financial payment to 
producers when an operation’s actual yield falls below the guarantee.  RP and RP-HPE 
base similar support on a farm’s revenue guarantee.  Both of the revenue products 
function in a similar manner by which payments are made when actual revenue drops 
below the predefined protection level.  Under RP the revenue guarantee is calculated off 
the higher of the planting-time or harvest-time average futures price, while RP-HPE 
calculates the guarantee only on the planting-time average futures price (USDA Risk 
Management Agency, 2011a). 
Finally, the third set of tools available to stabilize crop revenue come from 
marketing tools including futures, options, and cash contracts traded either on publically 
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regulated exchanges or transacted in private markets.  A multitude of marketing options 
exist to offset price declines and stabilize revenue.  In the most basic form, selling futures 
contracts or buying put options serve as the means to predefine a sale price of growing or 
harvested crops in the future (CME Group, 2011).  Cash contracts predefine a 
commodities’ price in the future along with the delivery location.  Cash marketing of 
crops involves directly selling the commodity at harvest-time.     
All of these alternatives are relevant to the risk management discussion.   Each act 
uniquely against revenue declines.  Yield and price remain the core component of 
revenue.  Interactions amongst the various options against yield or price declines create 
different levels of protection and expected payouts.  Alternative marketing strategies only 
protect against price declines, whereas other crop revenue stabilization options may 
protect against yield declines as well. 
2.2 Overlap and Participation Rates  
 Lubben and Novak (2010) present an overview of the various safety nets and 
price support options relevant to producers in Nebraska.  In their analysis these options 
are either classified as affecting the farm, area, or national levels of risk along with the 
scope of protection guarding against price, revenue, or production declines.  In Figure 
2.1, adapted and revised from Lubben and Novak, updates to the decision aid schematic 
show the various options available to producers during the 2011 production year and how 
the tools overlap or integrate to form the farm income crop revenue safety net.   
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Figure 2.1 The Farm Income Safety Net 
 In additional to the tools previously reviewed, Figure 2.1 notes the Adjusted 
Gross Revenue (AGR), Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement (CAT), Group Risk 
Plan (GRP), Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP), Group Risk Income Protection- 
Harvest Revenue Option (GRIP/H), and Pasture, Range, and Forage (PRF) insurance 
options offered by RMA, as well as hedging.  Although producers have these alternatives 
availiable, GRP, GRIP, and GRIP/H offer support upon county production and CAT 
serves as a minimal insurance product paying in the event of severe damages.  The CAT, 
GRP, GRIP, and GRIP/H tools are not considered in this analysis.  AGR and PRF remain 
in pilot stages for select qualifying operations (USDA Risk Management Agency, 
2011a).  Types of hedging activities may vary across farms, but an active marketing plan 
should incorportate a sales strategy as part of the risk management tool portfolio.   
 Crop insurance participation rates in Nebraska shows RP, RP-HPE, and YP 
account for about 99% of all policies written during 2011.  Aggregating insured corn, 
soybean, and wheat acreages indicates RP is prefered for the vast majority of units at 
84.5%, YP second at 11.6%, and RP-HPE third at 3.9% (USDA Risk Management 
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Agency, 2011b).  Simlar analysis may be drawn about USDA Farm Service Agency 
(FSA) programs  denoted in Figure 2.1.  CCP participation during the 2010 production 
year in Nebraska represents 74.2% of total farm acres enrolled versus only 25.8% for 
ACRE (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2011).  These statistics highlight the underlying 
assumptions producers make regarding the performance and expected level of protection 
when selecting government programs and crop insurance products.    
 Zulauf (2011) expands further on the elements of a farm income safety net when 
describing the interactions between government programs and private insurance products.  
By design, these tools create overlap, but crop insurance focuses on farm-specific 
idiosyncratic hazards, whereas government programs cover widespread systemic losses.  
Declines in crop revenue may be attributed to a loss that falls in either category.  A 
comprehensive analysis of farm-level crop revenue must include a study of the tools and 
strategies producers are currently using to cover these potential revenue losses.    
2.3 Safety Net Decisions  
 Crop producers face a multitude of potential farm program, crop insurance, and 
marketing combinations when devising a risk management strategy.  Pennings, 
Isengildina-Massa, Irwin,  Garcia, and Good (2008) note potential combinations of risk 
management tools to consider in the decision making process increase at a factorial rate 
with each additional instrument, but underlying factors influence the process.  Through 
analyzing the 2001 Agricultural and Resource Management Surveys (ARMS), Uematsu 
and Mishra (2010) found operator characteristics such as age, being raised on a farm, off-
farm labor, total acres, and capital costs all had a positive influence on the adoption of 
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risk management tools.  Participation rates with crop insurance products and government 
programs were found to increase with operation size. 
Velandia, Rejesus, Knight, and Sherrick (2009) found similar results utilizing a 
2001 survey of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa corn and soybean farmers about operator 
characteristics and utilization of different strategies.  A second finding shows producers 
consider how net return distributions interact with various revenue stabilization 
instruments.  Connections between revenue stabilization strategies and idiosyncratic and 
systemic risk serve as the basis for a producer’s use of the tools.  Operator characteristics 
also guide preferences and selection of different risk management tools. 
Policy discussions during the 2008 Farm Bill formation period created the ACRE 
program in addition to the CCP and DP previously available.  Cooper (2009) discussed 
how a revenue-based program was initially projected to be more effective than 
previously-established price-based income support and ad hoc disaster programs for a 
producer’s bottom line.  Although moving towards greater protection against revenue 
declines, ACRE does not serve as a direct substitute for crop insurance or disaster 
programs.  ACRE and CCP focus on state revenue or national price risk coming from 
aggregated systemic risk.  Crop insurance or disaster programs focus on the farm-level 
production risk advancing from idiosyncratic risk (Shields, Monke, & Schnepf, 2010). 
While keeping these risk attributes in mind, Woolverton and Young (2009) 
outlined ACRE enrollment questions which producers must evaluate when decidng to 
participate.  Primary factors to consider include price and yield expectations, state versus 
farm-level yield correlation, cash flow changes with a reduction in rates with the DPs or 
LDPs, and risk preferences.  Coble, Dismukes, and Thomas (2007) elaborated on the 
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issue of farm-level correlations with state yields even further.  Strong correlation with 
individual farm yields and state averages may generate large program payments.  Low 
correlations between farm and state crop revenue can lead to poor program performance.  
Campiche and Harris (2010) cited previous sources on overlap between potential 
payments from revenue protection under ACRE and crop insurance, but the true risk 
distributions show overlap limited to 5% or less.  Taking this factor into account, 
producers may gain the greatest protection by selecting both ACRE and crop revenue 
insurance.  Revenue guarantees with ACRE reflect price and yield levels closer to actual 
production, whereas DCP price supports coupled with historical bases may not reflect 
current cropping patterns and productivity levels.  Given these fundamental differences in 
ACRE and DCP, low particiation rates indicate producers in Nebraska must expect 
potential ACRE payouts to be less than the declines in DPs.  Discrepanicies between 
producer actions and literature on decision making suggest areas for further inquiry.   
Participation in different hedging activities remains correlated with purchases of 
crop insurance products (Velandia et al., 2009).  Selection of different tools from the 
portfolio of programs or products shows these activites do not have mutually-exclusive 
properties.  Operator characteristics coupled with expectations about currently-available  
tools serve as the basis to guide risk decisions.  The production aspects of producers 
across Nebraska may lead to one strategy being preferable for a region, but not 
neccesarily across the entire state.  These questions may be answered through the 
stochastic simulation modeling of yields and prices.  
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2.4 Simulation Models 
 Simulation and forecast modeling relevant to portfolio analysis of risk 
management tools has historically focused on either a sector-level analysis or 
representative-farm comparison.  This type of research serves as the basis for identifying 
a modeling and analysis procedure relevant to farm-level decisions in Nebraska.  
Building upon previous simulation modeling and incorporating the scope and variability 
of Nebraska farms leads to analysis relevant to the diversity of cropping patterns across 
the state.   
At a sector level, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) 
(2011) provides annual agricultural baseline projections and policy analysis.  However, 
estimates provided by the FAPRI model are aggregated and may not reflect the outcomes 
relevant for farm-level decision making.  Projected values do provide value in national 
policy debates and overall judgment of expected performance of major sectors 
composing the agricultural industry.  Forecast values serve as a baseline in farm-level 
simulation modeling done at Texas A&M University (Richardson, Outlaw, Knapek, 
Raulston, Herbst, Anderson, & Klose, 2011).   
In another sectoral analysis, Coble and Dismukes (2008) outlined potential 
average payouts from integrating government programs and crop insurance across 
eligible acres across the United States.  Dismukes, Arriola, and Coble (2010) further 
evaluated potential ACRE payouts across the United States and identified average 
variability rates of yields pertinent to the program’s revenue triggers.  Their results also 
reaffirmed the importance of correlation between farm and state-level yields related to the 
likelihood of potential ACRE payouts.  Zulauf and Orden (2010) took a historical 
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perspective in evaluating national ACRE program costs in lieu of CCPs and a reduction 
in DPs during the 1996 to 2008 period and forecasts for 2008 to 2012.  These findings 
show ACRE would have reduced government expenditures during the historical period, 
but would have increased them during the forecast.        
 Projections from the FAPRI model serve as parameters for farm-level modeling 
taking place at the Agriculture and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M 
University.  The models used by AFPC evaluate different risk alternatives for 
approximately 98 representative crop, livestock, and dairy farms strategically located 
across the United States to forecast the financial health of these operations under 
alternative policies and production scenarios.  Nebraska’s contribution to the AFPC 
project are two representative grain farms located in the south central portion of the state 
measuring 2,400 and 4,300 acres in size (Richardson et al., 2011).  These models, while 
generally representative, lack the detail for wide application across the state.     
 Based off the north-central Iowa, northern Arkansas, and southern Texas 
representative farms in the AFPC annual model, Knapek, Richardson, Outlaw, and 
Raulston (2011) evaluated eight different simulation scenarios involving various 
government and crop insurance combinations.  This study used the coefficient of 
variation to measure the effects of the various combinations on net farm revenue.  
Findings of interest to Nebraska grain and oilseed producers indicated crop insurance 
coupled with the available government programs provides the lowest coefficient of 
variation versus any single option alone.  Raulston, Richardson, Outlaw, and  Knapek, 
(2011) also uses a set of AFPC representative farms to evaluate the performance of 
whole-farm revenue insurance in place of available government programs.  
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 Woodard, et al. (2010) expand upon previous crop insurance studies by 
integrating a multi-crop framework in the simulation analysis of crop insurance products 
relevant to producers in Illinois.  Yield distributions utilized in their investigation came 
from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) record keeping system 
historical data series.  This study indicates farm-level insurance outperforms the county 
product equivalent due to a producer’s yields having lower correlations with the larger 
aggregated distributions.  Also, the evaluation of a single-crop model versus a multi-crop 
framework significantly influences results on expected revenue distributions.   
 Drawing upon the FBFM and Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) 
yield series, Zulauf, Schnitkey, and Langemeier (2010) modeled a more extensive 
evaluation by incorporating the interactions between ACRE, SURE, and RP.  Results 
show that 75% RP has a larger impact for Kansas farms, whereas ACRE provides greater 
protection for Illinois farms.  These findings highlight the influence that geographical and 
climatic patterns have on the performance of various risk management tools.      
 With the diversity in size, numbers, and location of farms throughout Nebraska, 
previous studies and research are not sufficient upon which to base decisions for all 
producers in the state.  Many of the previous research studies highlight findings on 
selected tools.  A theme common amongst previous studies and many forecasting 
methods is to use information from the past such as variability to predict possible future 
yield and price distributions.  Clearly, the literature indicates that understanding 
interactions among the various programs, products, or marketing strategies provides the 
most insight on how the optimal risk management strategy might be given different 
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regions of the state.  Previous models and procedures serve as a basis to develop a system 
to evaluate risk management decisions involving the portfolio of options available.     
2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed 
 Nebraska crop producers face risk in the form of uncertainty in prices and yields.  
Government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing strategies create the 
portfolio of risk management tools producers have at their disposal.  By design, these 
instruments create overlap in protection against yield, price, or revenue declines.  
Expectations about the performance of these tools affect the decision producers make 
when implementing risk management strategies.  
Previous research focuses at an aggregate level to evaluate policy costs as well as 
the overall health of the agricultural sector in the United States.  Also, these models have 
only a few farms that are not fully representative of Nebraska agriculture.  As the optimal 
risk management strategy varies depending upon a producer’s size and location, more 
specific modeling is needed.  Referencing literature cited above, farm-level risk 
management modeling with application for Nebraska crop producers is developed in the 
next chapter to focus on evaluating alternative strategies utilizing the portfolio of risk 
management tools across different regions of the state.      
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CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Stochastic simulation modeling serves as the foundation for assessing scenarios 
when implementing different risk management strategies.  The diversity in scale, 
cropping patterns, and production methods across Nebraska creates challenges when 
constructing representative farms for regions across the state.  Forming a set of 
representative farms depicting typical characteristics and attributes allows for the 
assessment of different levels of risk exposure and management decisions on crop 
revenue.  Cropping patterns, yield expectations, and actual variability differ with climatic 
patterns and soil types.  Parameters expressing the average acreage, crop mix, and 
productivity factors must be representative of the farms used in the following analysis to 
establish an appropriate simulation.    
3.1 Representative Model of Nebraska Crop Production 
To estimate program parameters relevant to the different Nebraska crop 
production areas, a set of commodity yields and prices need to be modeled for the 
simulation of crop revenue, government programs, crop insurance products, and 
marketing strategies.  The relevant set of parameters includes yields at the national, state, 
district, county, and farm level along with relevant prices.  While national and state yield 
distributions are relevant across Nebraska, selecting the appropriate districts, counties, 
and farm-level locations needs further evaluation.  Also, price ranges for cash sales, 
government programs, and crop insurance products all require appropriate basis 
adjustments to the base simulation price.   
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3.1.1 Geographical Regions 
The geography of Nebraska varies across the state causing production systems 
and cropping patterns to differ due to these properties.  These physical features influence 
cropping patterns and expected trend yields seen throughout the state.  Irrigation remains 
a strong feature for many operations because of available water sources.  Irrigated crops 
have higher expected yield projections and less variability than dryland grain and oilseed 
crops.  Crops not receiving additional moisture from irrigation and solely relying on 
precipitation for water will be referenced as dryland crops.  Accurately assessing the 
productivity and cropping acreages must take into account these unique attributes.             
 
 
Figure 3.1 Nebraska National Agriculture Statistics Service-Agricultural Statistical 
Districts (NASS-ASDs) and Representative County Simulation Sites 
 
 The NASS-ASDs subdivide Nebraska’s 93 counties into eight regions.  Figure 3.1 
displays the eight NASS-ASDs for Nebraska.  Consistent with NASS’s definitions the 
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districts are named as well as numbered.  Counties within each district share similar 
production characteristics and yield expectations.  Also in Figure 3.1, one county per 
district has been outlined as a representative county within the district.  The districts and 
their representative counties include: Northwest 10 – Morrill, North 20 – Holt, Northeast 
30 – Wayne, Central 50 - Sherman, East 60 – Butler, Southwest 70 – Hayes, South 80 – 
Kearney, and Southeast 90 – Saline.  These counties represent the typical attributes of a 
district’s productivity and cropping patterns.  Specifying districts and counties showing 
representative attributes of Nebraska crop production allows for parameter estimation of 
crop yields from historical NASS records.  
3.1.2 Commodity Prices  
 Crop revenue, government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing 
strategies under evaluation require modeling of different prices.  At the most basic level, 
crop revenue equals the yield times the cash selling price per bushel at harvest for a 
particular commodity.  Government programs including ACRE and CCP base safety nets 
off the national MYA price.  The ML safety net is calculated from adjusted national price 
and national average loan rates.  Crop insurance products such as YP, RP, and RP-HPE 
base indemnities either off the average of planting-time or harvest-time price for a 
particular commodity futures contract.  Finally, forward contracting, hedging, options, or 
marketing strategies involving a combination of these tools also use futures prices 
corresponding to a particular commodity futures contract. 
   Price parameter specification limits the complexity of modeling while capturing 
the appropriate relationships.  The difference between the planting-time and harvest-time 
average futures prices is used as a proxy to simulate price variability.  Daily futures price 
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series from commodity exchanges are maintained by the Commodity Research Bureau 
(CRB) (Commodity Research Bureau, 2011).  Based upon these historical records annual 
deviations from the planting-time price to the harvest-time price were determined to serve 
as the stochastic price elements.   
The simulated harvest-time futures price provides the basis from which other 
price parameters are derived.  Historical MYA prices reported by NASS allowed for 
generating a 10-year average fixed basis between harvest-time futures prices and MYA 
prices (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2011).  MYA prices recorded by 
NASS relevant to the model include one each at the national and state level.  Government 
programs that rely on a national MYA price utilize the simulated futures price plus the 
national MYA basis, whereas the farm-level revenue calculations use the harvest-time 
futures plus the state MYA basis to determine a cash price.   
3.1.3 Crop Acres and Yields 
Crop acres and yields necessary for evaluating effects of risk management tools 
include national, state, district, county, and representative farm yields.  Also, at the farm 
level, crop acreage and mix reflecting the average characteristics of a farm operating in 
each NASS-ASD need to be developed. To derive these characteristics, a variety of data 
sets contain the necessary elements to project crop mix or yields, variability, and farm 
size.  Historical variations from expectations serve as the basis for determining deviations 
from trend yields.    
NASS maintains annual yield and harvested acreage data for the national, state, 
district, and county levels (USDA National Agricultural Statistical Service, 2011).  In 
some regions or counties, data was limited due to confidentiality issues.  Using available 
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county-level acreage and yield values, the irrigation and dryland cropping practices for 
all major crops in Nebraska can be aggregated to the district level.  These values show 
distinct cropping patterns across major regions of Nebraska.  Wheat production is 
concentrated in the western part of the state, whereas soybean acres are concentrated in 
the eastern area.  Irrigation is a practice factor throughout the state.   
Annual yield data series observed from the NASS database including the nation, 
state, districts, and counties serve as the foundation for stochastic simulation values.  
Trend yields are estimated at the national, state, and district level leaving the deviations 
from trend as a measure of crop variability in a specific area.  County yields were 
regressed directly off of district yields according to crop and practice.  Also, to estimate 
farm-level yields, an implied volatility procedure utilizing RMA crop insurance product 
quotes allowed for the expansion of county yields to the farm level to express 
idiosyncratic risk elements.  Yields selected for simulation were chosen based upon the 
percentage of overall crops comprising harvested cropland acres for a particular area.   
Farm-level revenue modeling requires crop yields and acreages representative of 
operations in a given district or county.  To gain a broader perspective on the size and 
scale of Nebraska farm operations, the 2007 Census of Agriculture conducted by USDA 
NASS provides cropland acres and total number of operators sorted according to gross 
farm income ranges (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009).  Operations 
in Nebraska with gross farm income above $100,000 per year account for the greatest 
percentage of overall commodity production.  Therefore, using acres and farm numbers 
from these operations provides a set of representative farms that reflect typical 
commodity production in Nebraska.  Based upon operations in the 2007 Census of 
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Agriculture meeting the income parameters, the total cropland acres and producers at the 
district level were aggregated from the county data.  Dividing these two figures provides 
the average number of cropland acres per representative site in each district.   
From the aggregated harvested acres data at the county level, these values were 
weighted at the district level to determine the percent of each major crop and practices for 
the respective region.  These values were multiplied by the average number of cropland 
acres for each representative farm to create the acreage distributions in Table 3.1.  The 
farms in each column are named according to the geographic regions which these farms 
represent.   Crops are excluded from a representative farm if they are not a significant 
part of the district’s crop mix.    
Table 3.1 Representative Farm Sites with Cropland Acres, Expected Yields, and 
Actual Production History (APH) 
 
Table 3.1 also displays expected farm-level trend yields in 2011 and APH yields 
based upon the 2001-2010 time period.  Using the county level yields and adding in a 
Cropland Acres
District 10 
Farm 
District 20
Farm 
District 30 
Farm 
District 50 
Farm 
District 60 
Farm 
District 70 
Farm 
District 80 
Farm 
District 90 
Farm 
Corn Irrigated 372.9 891.0 230.1 794.7 318.9 702.6 558.6 280.4
Corn Dryland        - 157.2 380.2 126.8 273.4 282.6 171.5 377.7
Soybeans Irrigated        - 329.1 147.7 206.0 173.7 96.9 303.7 173.8
Soybeans Dryland        -        - 303.9        - 259.8        -        - 377.5
Winter Wheat 874.4        -        -        -        - 522.3 167.0        -
Total 1247.3 1377.3 1062.0 1127.5 1025.8 1604.3 1200.8 1209.3
Expected Yields 
2011 (bu./acre)
Corn Irrigated 166.0 188.1 205.7 194.9 190.5 193.4 204.6 195.8
Corn Dryland        - 76.5 155.5 94.0 129.9 71.1 112.5 111.3
Soybeans Irrigated        - 58.0 56.0 60.0 60.0 58.6 63.0 58.7
Soybeans Dryland        -        - 47.5        - 42.7        -        - 39.3
Winter Wheat 42.0        -        -        -        - 41.0 48.1        -
Actual Production History
2001-2010 (bu./acre)
Corn Irrigated 156.9 175.0 185.4 181.8 183.2 183.0 193.0 186.2
Corn Dryland        - 71.5 131.9 81.4 123.4 68.4 89.2 111.5
Soybeans Irrigated        - 51.6 53.3 55.9 56.6 55.6 59.0 56.6
Soybeans Dryland        -        - 42.1        - 42.1        -        - 38.7
Winter Wheat 35.4        -        -        -        - 43.0 46.7        -
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stochastic, idiosyncratic risk element creates the farm-level yields.  Implied yield 
volatility from crop insurance premiums was used to generate the stochastic element 
necessary to derive yield variability representative to those crops being modeled at the 
farm level.  Also, crops modeled at the district and county level were appropriately 
correlated with those represented at the farm level.  District and county yields are 
modeled only for those crops and practices that are included at the representative farm 
level.   
Other acreage and yield parameters relevant to the farm level for analysis of risk 
management tools relate to government programs.  ACRE, CCP, and DP require base 
acre and yield parameters.  For this analysis, total base acres are assumed to equal total 
cropland acres for each of the representative farms.  The ACRE Olympic average yield 
for a particular farm equals the average of the APH yields over the past five years with 
high and low values dropped from the tabulations.  Planted acres for the ACRE program 
reflect those crops actually being raised for the current production year, whereas those for 
DP and CCP reflect those established by historical values for previous production years 
specified by a particular farm bill program.  Also program yields reflect those of 
historical records available from a weighted data set maintained by USDA-FSA (USDA 
Farm Service Agency, 2006). 
Depicting the scale, productivity, and crop mix of farms across Nebraska remains 
a challenge due to the sheer number of operations.  The eight representative farms across 
the state aim to accurately reflect the typical crop revenue attributes for major 
geographical regions.  Equally important to the model is the positive and negative 
interactions among yield and price variables.  Observing correlations between these 
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relationships allows for idiosyncratic and systemic relationships to flow throughout the 
simulation.    
3.2 Correlated Model 
Previously cited literature outlines the purpose of correlations between yield and 
price distributions in stochastic simulations.  Depending upon the interactions of price 
with various levels of yield aggregation, performance of risk management tools may 
vary.  At the base of the modeling procedure, a moving linear trend was fitted to the yield 
data to determine deviations from projections.  Price deviations were calculated as the 
deviation in the average futures prices between planting time and harvest time.  The raw 
deviations were non-stationary and were detrended to account for biases resulting from 
trend due to technological and productivity gains over time.  Finally, a multi-step 
procedure was used to determine and model the directionality of correlations between 
yield and price parameters to allow for their full expression between simulation variables.      
3.2.1 Yield and Price Deviations 
Over time, yield and price parameters either positively or negatively deviated 
from expectations.  These variations account for systemic and idiosyncratic shocks 
expressed across various production levels.  As the level of yield aggregation decreases, 
the deviations from trend increase due to the effects of decreasing averaging over smaller 
land areas.  These historical deviations serve as the source of variability in the simulation 
model.  Stochastic deviations are assumed to have normalized distributions based upon 
preliminary analysis failing to reject the null hypothesis.  Yield deviations were 
calculated for all crops and practices and evaluated at the national, state, and district 
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levels, whereas the county and farm-level yields were regressed directly from higher-
level yields.  Table 3.2 shows the 42 calculated yield deviations along with the 
corresponding regions, cropping practices, and values.     
For every yield deviation, a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) moving trend 
regression were fitted for each 30 years of data.  For example, the 1990 deviation for 
irrigated corn in District 30 represents a forecast of the derivation from the linear trend 
fitted to the actual data between 1960 and 1989.  The following year’s calculation, 1991, 
bases the deviation off the OLS refitted to 1961 to1990.  This process is repeated 
annually so that readjustments of the linear trend were included.  The method accounts 
for structural changes, such as increases in productivity to happen over time.  Deviations 
for price represent the difference between the planting-time and harvest-time average 
futures price to determine expected fall harvest price.  Subject to a basis difference, the 
stochastic futures deviations create the price values for all revenues, programs, and 
products evaluated.   
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Table 3.2 National, State, and District Yield Variable Deviations 
 
Variable Region Crop Practice1 Value Variability
crnfutprdv United States corn futures prices deviation
soyfutprdv United States soybeans futures prices deviation
hrwwhtfutprdv United States hard red 
winter wheat
futures price deviation
uscrntotylddv United States corn total yield deviation
ussoytotylddv United States soybean total yield deviation
uswhttotylddv United States wheat total yield deviation
necrnirrylddv Nebraska corn irrigated yield deviation
necrndryylddv Nebraska corn total yield deviation
nesoyirrylddv Nebraska soybean irrigated yield deviation
nesoydryylddv Nebraska soybean dry yield deviation
newhttotylddv Nebraska wheat total yield deviation
D10crnirrylddv District 10 corn irrigated yield deviation
D20crnirrylddv District 20 corn irrigated yield deviation
D30crnirrylddv District 30 corn irrigated yield deviation
D50crnirrylddv District 50 corn irrigated yield deviation
D60crnirrylddv District 60 corn irrigated yield deviation
D70crnirrylddv District 70 corn irrigated yield deviation
D80crnirrylddv District 80 corn irrigated yield deviation
D90crnirrylddv District 90 corn irrigated yield deviation
D20crndryylddv District 20 corn dry yield deviation
D30crndryylddv District 30 corn dry yield deviation
D50crndryylddv District 50 corn dry yield deviation
D60crndryylddv District 60 corn dry yield deviation
D70crndryylddv District 70 corn dry yield deviation
D80crndryylddv District 80 corn dry yield deviation
D90crndryylddv District 90 corn dry yield deviation
D20soyirrylddv District 20 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D30soyirrylddv District 30 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D50soyirrylddv District 50 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D60soyirrylddv District 60 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D70soyirrylddv District 70 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D80soyirrylddv District 80 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D90soyirrylddv District 90 soybean irrigated yield deviation
D30soydryylddv District 30 soybean dry yield deviation
D60soydryylddv District 60 soybean dry yield deviation
D90soydryylddv District 90 soybean dry yield deviation
D10whttotylddv District 10 wheat total yield deviation
D70whttotylddv District 70 wheat total yield deviation
D80whttotylddv District 80 wheat total yield deviation
1 Total cropping practices include all irrigated and dryland production and
acreage for a particular region.  
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3.2.2 Detrending Deviations  
To account for changes occurring in corn, soybean, and wheat yields, including 
deviations due to technological and productivity advancements, an OLS regression was 
used to detrend deviations of actual production from the linear projections.  To be 
consistent, all deviations from the linear projections were detrended for each level of 
yield and price.  With the relatively small sample size of deviations from the linear 
projections, the OLS proved to be the most effective method to handle the stationarity 
issue.  Once the deviations from the linear trend projections were detrended, the 
following correlation procedure was utilized to allow for relationships to carry through at 
every price and yield levels.     
3.2.3 Correlation Procedure 
Lubben and Jansen (2010) have shown that correlation relationships involving 
MYA prices along with national, state, district, and county crop yields in Nebraska.  
These values show yields and prices at various levels have statistically significant 
relationships.  Depending upon the particular variable, programs or products under 
evaluation may preform differently depending upon the strength of yield and price 
correlations to the critical program value.  Correlations must be maintained between the 
96 stochastic yield and price variables.  Every draw of the simulation needs to relay the 
correlative effects of yields and price elements on other variables.  To achieve this goal, 
an approach using a base correlation matrix coupled with sorted Directed Acyclic Graphs 
(DAGs) allows for observation of the respective relationships.  This procedure illustrates 
the relationships amongst variables at a given level of statistical significance.   
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First in the model, a correlation matrix simultaneously draws the relationship 
between 12 national and state time-adjusted yield parameters along with the respective 
price.  These become the base values of the model.  Given the software used, increasing 
the number of relationships beyond these 12 parameters causes singularity and non-
convergence in the correlation matrix.  Relationships between lower aggregation levels 
such as district, county, and farm level yields still need to be calculated with respect to 
the underlying correlations.  A multi-step procedure involving TETRAD IV, yield 
regressions, and crop insurance yield calibrations allows for the interactions to carry 
through at the lower aggregation levels. 
The various relationships involving the state and district time-adjusted yield 
deviations were decomposed using TETRAD IV software to determine the causal nature 
of the variables to each other (Spirtes, Sheines, Ramsey, & Glymour, 2005).  First the 
deviations were sorted according to cropping practices involving irrigation and dryland 
production.  Limitations in TETRAD IV do not allow for all 42 state and district yield 
variables listed in Table 3.2 to be analyzed all in the same DAG pattern.  Correlations 
between state and district variables show the strongest relationships involving those by 
irrigation practice.  Sorting irrigated and dryland time-adjusted deviations does not imply 
a mutually exclusive property between the production methods, but a higher level of 
relationship relevance and stability.    
After sorting and uploading the variables to TETRAD IV, a DAG search 
produced in Figure 3.2 for the irrigated variables and Figure 3.3 for the dryland 
counterparts outline the causal relationships.  Arrows or edges connecting the variable 
sets show the directionality and relationships of patterns.  Output images were sorted 
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according to the base state variables leading lower aggregation level time-adjusted 
district deviations.  Based upon this assumption, district to state arrow directionalities 
were reversed to reflect the larger state groups making them lower level variables.  This 
method assures that outcomes of all variables are consistent with the next higher level of 
aggregation.    
A line connecting two variables in a DAG, but not possessing an arrow to infer 
causality in flow indicates an undirected edge.   For these outlines the assumption was 
made that the state or higher-level district variables directed the unspecified edge in the 
lower level respective relationships.  Also, DAG do not allow circular references among 
variables.  Undirected edges and arrows in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 use Fischer’s z-test 
statistics to determine the DAG relationships which have statistical significance.  Any 
relationship failing to be statistically different from zero are not displayed on the 
resulting image. 
Figure 3.2 displays the appropriate relationships between the 17 irrigated time-
adjusted yield deviations.  Depending upon the strength of these interactions, causality of 
the direct edges relays the direction.  Simulation distributions must take these interactions 
into consideration when modeling the system to examine yield variability on crop 
revenue across different regions.  Assumptions made about correlations between yield 
parameters are affirmed by DAG analysis.     
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Figure 3.2 Irrigated State and District Yield Deviation Directed Acyclic Graph 
(DAG) 
Observations about Figure 3.2 carry through for the 16 dryland time-adjusted 
yield deviations in Figure 3.3.  Due to the limitations in cropping practices involving 
dryland production, fewer regions have dryland soybeans versus irrigated soybeans.   
Based upon the DAG diagram, district time-adjusted yield deviations were regressed on 
the leading state or district variables according to the relationships documented.  These 
relationships between nodes allows for the identification of independent variables with 
regards to a particular dependent variable.    
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Figure 3.3 Dryland State and District Yield Deviation Directed Acyclic Graph 
(DAG) 
As the linkage between district and county yields remain high due to a strong 
correlation, direct relationships between these variables was drawn without a DAG 
search.  By using this assumption, the direct relationships by crop and production practice 
between district and county variables serve as a basis of regressing lower-level yields off 
the higher-level yields.  By using this approach, correlations can be properly identified 
and used, assuring a feasible simulation.  Historical county yields by crop and practice 
serve as the dependent variable in the regression off the independent higher-level district 
yields.  County simulation variables were not adjusted for the trend resulting from the 
33 
 
 
time progression because independent district yields already account for this element in 
the model.    
To derive yields representative of expectations and variability for the model 
farms, a stochastic component was added to the simulated county level yields in which a 
particular farm lies.  Miranda’s (1991) implied volatility procedure utilizing crop 
insurance premiums allows for county level variability to be adjusted to the farm level.  
The calibration method assumes crop insurance premiums are assessed at actuarially fair 
rates.  Also, the expected county and farm-level yield for a particular crop and practice 
must be the same.  Through this process, the average variability expressed by farms 
operating in a particular county was obtained.   
By modeling the distributions through the procedure described statistically 
significant correlation relationships carry through with each random draw generated.  
Observing these associations or connections between the revenue components remains 
the core principle needed for evaluating a cohesive risk management strategy given a set 
of alternatives.  The following system of equations outlines the specific simulation and 
regression procedures applied to generate stochastic yield and price distributions.  Each 
formula elaborates on national, state, district, county, or farm-level aggregation.    
3.2.4 Equations 
 Estimated harvest-time average futures price distributions are simulated using 
equation 3.1.  Using a planting-time price for the starting parameter, the simulated 
harvest-time average futures price draws upon historical variability to create the price 
distribution.  Adjusting the simulated harvest-time average futures price with a fixed 
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basis produces the necessary cash price series for the risk management strategies under 
evaluation.      
݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺ݄ ௞ܲ௧ሻ ൅	݄ߝ෢௞௧		 (3.1) 
where ݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ	simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery 
of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
߃ሺ݄ ௞ܲ௧ሻ ൌ expected harvest-time futures price for harvest delivery of crop ݇ in 
time period ݐ 
݄ߝ෢௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of futures price deviation between the expected average 
futures price and the actual harvest-time average futures price for crop ݇ in time 
period ݐ where ݄ߝ෢௞௧~N൫0, ݄ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for k ൌ	{corn, soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period 2011 
 
and  ߃ሺ݄ ௞ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ܾ݌തതത௞௧ ൅ 	߃൫݄෢ܸ௞௧൯  
ܾ݌തതത௞௧ ൌ base planting-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of 
crop k in time period ݐ 
߃൫݄෢ܸ௞௧൯ ൌ	expected futures price deviation between planting-time and harvest-
time average futures price for harvest delivery of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
and ߃൫݄෢ܸ௞௧൯ is estimated from the following equation: 
 
where   ݄ V෢௞௧	 ൌ 	 ߛො଴௞ ൅	ߛොଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ ݄ߝ෢௞௧		  ߛො଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in price deviations of crop ݇ ߛොଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in price deviations of crop ݇ 
݄ߝ෢௞௧ as previously defined 
 
where  the regression is calculated on futures price deviation between planting-time and 
harvest-time average futures price for harvest delivery of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
for the time period {t-30,..,t-1}  
 
 Estimated national MYA cash prices are simulated using equation 3.2.  Using a 
fixed basis derived from the previous five years of historical data, the simulated harvest-
time futures price was adjusted to reflect the national MYA cash price.  Basis 
adjustments reflect the forces leading to the differences between the two price series.    
35 
 
 
݊෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ 	݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൅	݊ܯ෢௞௧			 (3.2)	
where ݊෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ	simulated national marketing year average cash price for crop ݇ in time 
period ݐ 
݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ	simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery 
of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݊ܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ estimated basis between the simulated harvest-time 30-day average 
futures price for harvest time delivery and national marketing year average cash 
price of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
for ݇ ൌ	{corn, soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period 2011 
 
and ݊ܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ 	 ∑ ሺ௡௉തതതതೖ೟ି	௛௉തതതതೖ೟ሻ
೟షభ೟షఱ
ହ 		  
݊ܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ estimated national marketing year basis from simulated futures 
harvesting average for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݊ܲതതതത௞௧ ൌ national marketing year average cash price for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݄ܲതതതത௞௧ ൌ harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of crop ݇ in 
time period ݐ 
 
where  the basis estimate is calculated on the average difference of ݊ ௞ܲ௧ െ	݄ ௞ܲ௧ for crop 
k in time period {t-5,..,t-1}  
 
 Similar to the national MYA price average cash price equation, the state 
marketing year average cash price is simulated using equation 3.3.  Once again, using the 
simulated harvest-time futures price serves as the base parameter, a fixed basis 
adjustment to this price series creates the state MYA cash price.  This simulated series 
serves as the price parameter for the cash selling price of all grains marketed by the 
representative farms.  
ݏ෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ 	݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൅	ݏܯ෢௞௧			 (3.3)	
where ݏ෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ	simulated state marketing year average cash price for crop ݇ in time 
period ݐ 
݄෪ܲ௞௧ ൌ	simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery 
of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
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ݏܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ estimated basis between the simulated harvest-time 30-day average 
futures price for harvest time delivery and state marketing year average cash price 
of crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
for ݇ ൌ	{corn, soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period 2011 
 
and ݏܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ 	 ∑ ሺ௦௉തതതതೖ೟ି	௦௉തതതതೖ೟ሻ
೟షభ೟షఱ
ହ 		  
ݏܯ෢௞௧	 ൌ estimated state marketing year basis from simulated futures harvesting 
average for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
ݏܲതതത௞௧ ൌ state marketing year average cash price for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݄ܲതതതത௞௧ ൌ harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of crop ݇ in 
time period ݐ 
 
where  the basis estimate is calculated on the average difference of ݏ ௞ܲ௧ െ	݄ ௞ܲ௧ for crop 
k in time period {t-5,..,t-1} 
 
 National crop yield distributions are simulated using formula 3.4 by using a trend 
line projection and past variability to generate the simulated distribution.  Through a 
system of moving trend lines, yield deviations were obtained from actual historical data.  
Based upon this variability, projections for the simulation year create the national yield 
distributions of the model.  Trend adjustments were made to the deviations to reflect 
productivity advancements of crop varieties.   
	݊෪ܻ௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺ݊ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൅ ݊ߝෞ௞௧	 (3.4) 
where ݊෪ܻ௞௧ ൌ simulated national yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ߃ሺ݊ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൌ expected national yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ݊ߝෞ௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted 
national yield and the actual national yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
݊ߝෞ௞௧~N൫0, ݊ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for ݇ ൌ	{corn, soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and ߃ሺ݊ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൌ ߚመ଴௞ ൅	ߚመଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ 	߃൫݊෢ܸ௞௧൯  
ߚመ଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
ߚመଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
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߃൫݊෢ܸ௞௧൯ ൌ	expected yield deviation between the expected national yield and the 
actual national yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
where  the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1} 
 
and ߃൫݊෢ܸ௞௧൯ is estimated from the following equation: 
 
where ݊෢ܸ௞௧ ൌ 	 ߛො଴௞ ൅	ߛොଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ ݊ߝෞ௞௧		  ߛො଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ ߛොଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ ݊ߝෞ௞௧	as previously defined 
 
where  the regression is calculated on deviations from trend line yields for the period {t-
30,..,t-1} and the trend yield in period t is calculated from regression on yields in 
period {t-30,..,t-1}  
 
 State crop yield distributions are simulated using formula 3.5 following a similar 
procedure as equation 3.4.  Once again, by using trend line yields coupled with past 
variation, the simulated projections reflect anticipated crop yield distributions at the state 
level.  Also, moving trend line yields was used to obtain deviations from expected yield 
and were trend adjusted to reflect advancements in productivity.   
ݏ෪ܻ௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺݏ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൅ ݏߝෝ ௞௧	 (3.5)	
where ݏ෪ܻ௞௧ ൌ simulated state yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ߃ሺݏ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൌ expected state yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ݏߝෝ ௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted state 
yield and the actual state yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
ݏߝෝ ௞௧~N൫0, ݏߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for ݇ ൌ	{corn, soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and ߃ሺݏ ௞ܻ௧ሻ ൌ ߚመ଴௞ ൅	ߚመଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ 	߃൫ݏ෢ܸ௞௧൯  
ߚመ଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
ߚመଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
߃൫ݏ෢ܸ௞௧൯ ൌ	expected yield deviation between the expected state yield and the 
actual state yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
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where  the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1} 
 
and ߃൫ݏ෢ܸ௞௧൯ is estimated from the following equation: 
 
where ݏ෢ܸ௞௧ ൌ 	 ߛො଴௞ ൅	ߛොଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ ݊ߝෞ௞௧		  ߛො଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ ߛොଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ ݏߝෝ ௞௧	as previously defined 
 
where  the regression is calculated on deviations from trend line yields for the period {t-
30,..,t-1} and the trend yield in period t is calculated from regression on yields in 
period {t-30,..,t-1}  
 
 To capture the relationships between equations 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 the error terms of 
݄ߝ෢௞௧, ݊ߝෞ௞௧, ܽ݊݀		ݏߝෝ ௞௧ are correlated.  By observing and maintaining these correlated 
relationships, the model accounts for systemic risk shocks.  These correlations may be 
positive or negative and will vary in terms of the strength of a relationship.  To carry 
these relationships between the respected equations in the model the following error 
terms are correlated.      
where ݄ߝ෢௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of futures price deviation between the expected average 
futures price and the actual harvest-time average futures price for crop ݇ in time 
period ݐ where ݄ߝ෢௞௧~N൫0, ݄ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
	݊ߝෞ௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the expected national 
yield and the actual national yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
݊ߝෞ௞௧~N൫0, ݊ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
ݏߝෝ ௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the expected state yield 
and the actual state yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where ݏߝෝ ௞௧~N൫0, ݏߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for  ݇ ൌ	{corn, irrigated corn, dryland corn, soybeans, irrigated soybeans, dryland 
soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period 2011 
 
Residuals are then correlated using the mxn matrix ሾߩሿ for all ݄ߝ෢௞௧, ݊ߝෞ௞௧, ݏߝෝ ௞௧ 
error terms 
 
where  ݉ ൌ ݊ ൌ 12 
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 District crop yields are simulated using equation 3.6.  This formula follows a 
similar procedure to national and state yields, where a trend line projection and deviation 
creates the simulated value.  District yield deviations were obtained by finding the 
difference between the moving trend line projection and actual historical data.  After 
trend adjusting these deviations, the variables were then regressed off other state or 
district deviations according to cropping practice guided by the DAG search.   
݀෪ܻ௜௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺ݀ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ 	൅	݀ߝ෢௞௧	 (3.6) 
where ݀෪ܻ௜௞௧ ൌ simulated district ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ߃ሺ݀ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ expected district ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݀ߝ෢௜௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted 
district ݅ yield and the actual district ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
݀ߝ෢௞௧~N൫0, ݀ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for ݅ ൌ {10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90}  
݇ ൌ	{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and ߃ሺ݀ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ ߚመ଴௞ ൅	ߚመଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ ߃൫݀෢ܸ௜௞௧൯ 
ߚመ଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
ߚመଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop ݇ 
߃൫݀෢ܸ௜௞௧൯ ൌ expected yield deviation between the expected district ݅ yield and the 
actual district ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
where  the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1}  
 
and ߃൫݀෢ܸ௜௞௧൯ is estimated from the following equations: 
 
where ݀෢ܸ௜௞௧ ൌ ߛො଴௞ ൅	ߛොଵ௞ሺݕ݁ܽݎሻ ൅ ݀ݓ෢௜௞௧		  ߛො଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ ߛොଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop ݇ 
݀ݓ෢௜௞௧ ൌ	estimated DAG residual for the relationship between state and other 
district yields and district ݅ yields for crop ݇ 
 
and ݀෢߱ ௜௞௧ ൌ ߜ଴௜௞ ൅	∑ ߜଵ௜௞ሺݏߝෝ ௞௧ሻ௞ ൅	∑ ߜଶ௜௞൫݀ݓ෢௜௞௧൯௜௞ 	൅	݀ߝ෢௞௧		  
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ߜ଴௜௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the relationship between state and other district 
yields and district ݅ yields for crop ݇ 
ߜଵ௜௞ ൌ estimated slope for the relationship between state and district ݅ yields for 
crop ݇ 
ߜଶ௜௞ ൌ estimated slope for the relationship between state and other district yields 
and district ݅ yields for crop ݇ 
݀ߝ෢௞௧	as previously defined 
 
where  ݀෢߱ ௜௞௧	is estimated from regression of time series adjusted deviations at the district 
level on time series adjusted deviations at the state and district level using 
hierarchal estimation procedures determined through the Tetrad DAG for ݅ ൌ {10, 
20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90} and ݇ ൌ	{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated 
soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat} 
 
 Following a direct relationship to district yields, county yields are simulated using 
equation 3.7.  The expected county yield and standard deviation are regressed off the 
district corresponding district yield by crop and practice.  Regressing county yields off of 
district yields carries correlations between each level of the simulation.   
	ܿ෪ܻ௝௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺܿ ௝ܻ௞௧ሻ ൅	ܿߝෝ௝௞௧		 (3.7)	
where 	ܿ෪ܻ௝௞௧ ൌ simulated county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
߃ሺܿ ௝ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ expected county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
ܿߝෝ௝௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted 
county ݆ yield and the actual county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
ܿߝෝ௝௞௧~N൫0, ܿߪଶ෢ ௝௞௧	൯ 
 
for ݆ ൌ	{Morrill, Holt, Wayne, Sherman, Butler, Hayes, Kearney, Saline} 
݇ ൌ	{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and ߃൫ܿ ௝ܻ௞௧൯ ൌ ߚመ଴௞ ൅	ߚመଵ௞൫݀෪ܻ௜௞௧൯ ൅	ܿߝෝ௝௞௧  
ߚመ଴௞ ൌ estimated intercept for the relationship between district and county yields 
of crop ݇ 
ߚመଵ௞ ൌ estimated slope for the relationship between district and county yields of 
crop ݇ 
ܿߝෝ௝௞௧ ൌ as previously defined 
 
where  ܿߝෝ௝௞௧ is estimated from the  regression of county j yields calculated on simulated 
district i yield of crop k in time period t in which ሼ݅, ݆ሽ take on the following 
41 
 
 
paired values: {(10, Morrill), (20, Holt), (30, Wayne), (50, Sherman), (60, Butler), 
(70, Hayes), (80, Kearney), (90, Saline)} 
 
 Farm-level yields are simulated using equation 3.8.  Yields on the representative 
farms have an average equal to county yield, but a variability level implied from crop 
insurance premiums for the 2011 production year.  Miranda’s formula allowed for the 
calibration of county-level yields to the representative farm.   
	݂෪ܻ௜௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൅	݂ߝ෢௜௞௧		 (3.8) 	
where ݂Y෪௜௞௧ ൌ simulated farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ expected farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݂ߝ෢௜௞௧ ൌ estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted farm 
yield and the actual farm yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ where 
݂ߝ෢௞௧~N൫0, ݂ߪଶ෢ ௞௧	൯ 
 
for ݅ ൌ 	 ሼ10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90ሽ 
݇ ൌ	{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and   ߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ 	ൌ 	ܿ ௝ܻ௞௧  
 
where  expected farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ is equal to the county ݆ yield for 
crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
and  ݂ߝ෢௜௞௧ is the idiosyncratic farm-level risk determined by using Miranda’s formula 
to expand county yield variability into farm-level variability that generates quoted 
RMA premium rates 
 
Similar to Coble and Dismukes’(2008) procedure, Miranda’s Formula (1991) was 
used to expand a county yield to a farm-level yield expressing idiosyncratic risk implied 
by the RMA crop insurance quotes specific to farms lying in a particular county.  Crop 
insurance premiums utilized in calibrating the yields had an assumed APH yield equal to 
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the farm’s specific county.  Also, quotes obtained were for the 2011 production year 
(Farmdoc, 2011).    
݂෪ܻ௜௞௧ ൌ 	߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൅	ܿߚ௝௞௧൫ܿ෪ܻ௝௞௧ െ 	߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ൯ ൅	݂ߝ෢௜௞௧				 	
where ݂Y෪௜௞௧ ൌ simulated farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ expected farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ ݂ߚ௜௞௧ ൌ measures the responsiveness in farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in comparison to 
county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
ܿ෪ܻ௝௞௧ ൌ simulated county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
߃ሺܿ ௝ܻ௞௧ሻ ൌ expected county ݆ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
݂ߝ෢௜௞௧ ൌ represents the estimated idiosyncratic level risk from calibrating county ݆ 
yield for crop ݇ to an average standard deviation equivalent to the expected 
variation on farm ݅ for crop k in time period t where ݂ߝ෢௜௞௧~N൫0, ݂ߪଶ෢ ௜௞௧൯ 
 
for ݅ ൌ 	 ሼ10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90ሽ 
݆ ൌ	{Morrill, Holt, Wayne, Sherman, Butler, Hayes, Kearney, Saline} 
݇ ൌ	{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat} 
ݐ ൌ time period for production year 2011 
 
and   ߃ሺ݂ ௜ܻ௞௧ሻ 	ൌ 	߃ሺܿ ௝ܻ௞௧ሻ  
 
where  expected farm ݅ yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ is equal to the expected county ݆ 
yield for crop ݇ in time period ݐ 
 
and  ܿߚ௝௞௧ 	ൌ 	1  
 
where  one represents the acreage weight of all yields in the county 
 
To derive the estimated farm-level standard deviation ݂ߪଶ෢ ௜௞௧ from insurance 
premiums for crop ݇ in time period ݐ, a grid search was used to find the minimum 
absolute value between the average expected premium rate and expected loss.     
  
where Minห݂ܴܲ௜௞௧ െ ܿܧܮܥ෫௝௞௧ห 
 
for ݂ܴܲ௜௞௧ 	ൌ the average effective premium rate for 65% coverage crop yield 
insurance on farm ݅ for crop ݇ during time period ݐ  
ܿܧܮܥ෫௝௞௧ 	ൌ simulated expected loss cost given in county ݆ for crop ݇ in time 
period ݐ 
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and  ܿܧܮܥ෫௝௞௧ ൌ 	 ቂ௙௉೔ೖ೟൫௙஼೔ೖ೟௲ሺ௙௒೔ೖ೟ሻି	௙ଢ଼෪೔ೖ೟	൯௙௉೔ೖ೟௙஼೔ೖ೟௲ሺ௙௒೔ೖ೟ሻ ቃ 
 
for ݂ ௜ܲ௞௧ 	ൌ crop insurance price guarantee on farm i for crop k in time period t  
݂ܥ௜௞௧ ൌ coverage level on farm i for crop k in time period t 
 
The expected loss cost was derived by comparing the ratio of indemnities 
conditioned on the guarantee ݂ ௜ܲ௞௧ and ݂ܥ௜௞௧.  After setting  ݂ܥ௜௞௧ equal to 0.65, a 
standard deviation grid search between 10 to 60 in intervals of 2 for ݂ߪ෢௜௞௧ was 
conducted and identified the value which minimized the difference between  
݂ܴܲ௜௞௧ and ܿܧܮܥ෫௜௞௧ .   
 
 The series of simulation equations created the variables necessary for evaluating 
different risk management strategies.  Equations established in the model ensured proper 
relationships and correlations are observed between each aggregation level.  Validation 
preformed on the model ensured the integrity of the simulation results.    
3.2.5 Validation 
To validate the simulation model, 500 stochastically simulated yield and price 
draws were used to verify the distribution against actual historical data.  These iterations 
were produced using a randomized year instead of the fixed trend year of 2011 to allow 
for the comparison of actual and simulated sample means and variances.  Evaluations of 
results were similar when using normalized distributions for prices and yields at different 
aggregation levels.  Also, test statistics showed correlations between the model 
parameters were statistically significant.  Validation verified the accuracy of relationships 
between different parameters to ultimately allow for evaluation of different risk 
management strategies across the representative farms.   
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3.3 Simulation Software 
To analyze yield and price variables across different risk management strategies, 
each simulation must contain a sufficient number of draws from the underlying 
distribution to consistently express the variation present.  Each alternative risk 
management strategy must carry the same variable distribution for each particular 
scenario.  Comparing the effects stabilization strategies have on crop revenue requires 
efficient methodology to examine these values.  Producers possessing different risk 
preferences require different methodologies to compare strategies.  Incorporating these 
simulation and preference details is necessary to accurately assess different strategies.           
3.3.1 SIMETAR 
A model of the correlated equations is constructed and analyzed using the 
software package Simulation & Econometrics to Analyze Risk (SIMETAR) developed at 
Texas A&M University (Richardson, Schumann, & Feldman, 2008).  As an add-on to the 
Microsoft Office 2010 Excel platform, distributions drawn in the program allow for each 
stochastic draw to maintain proper statistical relationships.  Also, each random yield and 
price set can be used to analyze different risk management scenarios, allowing for 
comparison between the different approaches.  Analysis tools incorporated in the 
simulation package have the ability to evaluate different alternatives given a range of risk 
preferences.    
3.3.2 Procedure 
Each analysis of the model utilizes 500 random draws from the yield and price 
distributions.  To generate these yield and price sets, SIMETAR’s simulation engine 
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follows the Latin Hypercube iteration process.  Under this methodology, each distribution 
being modeled must be stratified to cumulative probability scale from which each 
element has the likelihood of an equal draw.  The Latin Hypercube’s main advantage 
over the other commonly utilized Monte Carlo technique is an accurate distribution of the 
cumulative probability scale, whereas the second methodology may over- or under-
estimate a particular element of the distribution.  Using 500 iterations under the Latin 
Hypercube simulation procedure allows for a draw to properly cover a representation of 
the moments within a set (Richardson, Schumann, & Feldman, 2004).   
 Each alternative risk management scenario is evaluated using the same yield and 
price set to compare and draw inferences from the strategies.  Scenarios in SIMETAR 
allow for each exact moment in iteration to be repeated under a different revenue 
stabilization strategy.  The analysis evaluates each alternative risk management strategy 
for the effect these tools have on stabilizing crop revenue given a producer’s risk 
preference.  Tools incorporated in SIMETAR for the analysis of distributional outcomes 
include First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD), Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
(SDS), Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function (SDRF), StopLight charts, and 
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF).   
 Base crop revenue without any revenue stabilization strategy serves as the 
standard for comparing the other eight risk management strategies.  Using a constant risk 
aversion assumption with a decreasing relative risk preference, FSD and SDS rank 
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) drawn from the simulated revenue 
distributions and sorts these functions according to the probability of a certain level of 
income.  The strategy which dominates in receiving the highest level of income serves as 
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the most ideal scenario, but may cross an opposing strategy for FSD and only once for 
SDS.  A limitation of using this technique remains the assumption producers have a 
constant level of risk aversion, whereas individuals may have different preferences 
(Richardson, Klose, & Gray, 2000).   
 SDRF is similar to the SDS methodology, but allows for different risk aversion 
preferences.  Based upon a producer’s wealth factor, a Risk Aversion Coefficient (RAC) 
allows for lower and upper parameters to evaluate the most efficient set based upon 
available alternatives.  One limitation remains in that all pairwise correlation 
combinations must be run on the simulated distributions to determine the optimal 
scenario.   
 Another common method for ranking risky multiple scenarios involve StopLight 
charts.  These images graphically display the probability over multiple scenarios the 
likelihood of favorable (green) results, unfavorable (red) results, and results between the 
two parameters (yellow).  To establish the favorable and unfavorable criteria, values must 
be established to display the output in appropriate ranges.   Interpretation of the charts 
show the alternative with the greatest amount of green and the least red region indicate 
the most preferred scenario (Richardson et al., 2000).   
 SERF has advantages over the shortcomings of SDS and SDRF, but still allows 
for different preferences involving RACs.  Under this process a Certainty Equivalent 
(CE) must be calculated for RACs between an upper and lower value for the risk-to-
wealth factor.  Next, a graph of the analyzed data indicates over a range of risk-to-wealth 
factors which CE for a particular alternative is the greatest. The measurement between 
47 
 
 
two CE points represents the amount of wealth which will be forgone if the producer had 
to accept the next lower set given a particular RAC range (Richardson et al., 2000).   
 A combination of these techniques allows for the analysis of simulated crop 
revenue distributions and risk management strategies.  Selecting the appropriate 
alternatives or scenarios remains essential for drawing the appropriate inferences on crop 
revenue risk management strategies at the individual farm or region level.  Also, these 
procedures allow for concluding inferences on the performance of the risk management 
alternatives across the state.   
3.4 Scenarios 
Producers have multiple risk management tools available to stabilize and reduce 
declines in crop revenue from losses in yield or price.  These programs or products base 
guarantees off benchmark parameters.  Depending upon the assumptions for base yield 
and price values, resulting simulation distributions may have significantly different 
results.  When determining the values for base simulation prices, the purpose and design 
of various government programs must be kept in mind.  In addition to the base simulation 
parameters, specific scenarios need selection to limit the scope of modeling complexity 
and allow for solid inferences to be drawn across multiple farms.  Interactions at the 
individual farm level lead to inferences on strategies and potential policy implications for 
risk management tool design.     
3.4.1 Alternatives 
Producers face decisions on revenue stabilization strategies involving government 
programs, crop insurance products, and marketing tools.  Figure 3.4 documents the 
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individual components of each available for a particular decision level through the end of 
the 2012 production year.  At the core of revenue stabilization, these programs or 
products base guarantees off crop yield, price, or revenue.  Decision makers do not make 
selection of a particular option mutually exclusive from a subsequent option (Pennings et 
al., 2008).  For a given price and yield base, a total of 36 different scenarios exist if all of 
the options listed below were analyzed.          
 
Figure 3.4 Crop Revenue Risk Management Diagram 
 Assumptions made regarding the selection of scenarios limit key output variable 
analysis to allow for a cohesive examination among the representative farms.  Summary 
statistics drawn from simulation results indicate the effects different set strategies have on 
crop revenue.  The results also can provide insight on future research and policy 
implications for programs and products.     
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3.4.2 Scenario Assumptions 
 To analyze a feasible set of scenarios involving crop revenue risk management 
alternatives, assumptions must be made about the underlying logic implied in producer 
level decision making.  Alternative crop revenue stabilization tools documented in Figure 
3.4 show producers have to make choices regarding government programs, crop 
insurance products, and marketing strategy levels.  Based upon Figure 3.4, simulation 
scenarios outlined in Table 3.3 display nine alternatives to evaluate for the eight 
representative sites across Nebraska.  These scenarios serve as the basis for discussion 
involving specified risk management strategies for the following analysis, results, and 
conclusion discussion.            
 Scenarios 1-9 in Table 3.3 show the base comparison and alternative strategies 
involving three different groups of risk management tools.  In control case of Scenario 1, 
the farmer does not participate in any government program or purchase any crop 
insurance product and all commodities are cash marketed at harvest-time.  Next, 
Scenarios 2-5 and 6-9 group the scenarios according to whether a producer participates in 
the government options of DCP or ACRE.  Producers participating in either of these 
options have a base guaranteed DP; rational producers will choose to participate in one of 
the two not considering any limits or costs of farm program participation.  Separate from 
the guaranteed revenue, producers make assumptions about the performance of DCP 
versus ACRE in stabilizing systemic losses through either revenue or price guarantees.  
Evaluating whether a reduction in direct payments associated with participating in ACRE 
outweighs the potential crop revenue stabilization received under the newer program 
remains a fundamental question.   
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Table 3.3 Simulation Scenarios including Government Programs, Crop Insurance 
Products, and Marketing Strategies 
 
 After government program selection, producers must decide upon a crop 
insurance product and level of coverage.  Participation rates indicate the top three policies 
sold to grain and oilseed producers in Nebraska during the 2010 production year, in 
order, include RP, YP, and RP-HPE.  When examining coverage levels for these products 
on insured cropland acres, coverage rates for 70% account for the largest percentage of 
RP and RP-HPE units underwritten in the state.  Due to very low sales of RP-HPE, this 
particular product is excluded from the analysis (USDA Risk Management Agency, 
2011b).  After taking these factors into account, an appropriate pair of crop insurance 
products to evaluate includes RP and YP with a coverage rate of 70%.  
 Finally, marketing strategies encompass the third component in this analysis.  
Producers have the ability to use a cash marketing (CM), futures hedge (FH), or options 
Alternative Abbreviations1
Government 
Program2
Crop 
Insurance3
Marketing 
Strategy
Scenario 1 NP-NI-CM No Program No Insurance Cash Market
Scenario 2 DCP-RP-CM DCP RP 70% Cash Market
Scenario 3 DCP-RP-FH DCP RP 70% Futures Hedge
Scenario 4 DCP-YP-CM DCP YP 70% Cash Market
Scenario 5 DCP-YP-FH DCP YP 70% Futures Hedge
Scenario 6 ACRE-RP-CM ACRE RP 70% Cash Market
Scenario 7 ACRE-RP-FH ACRE RP 70% Futures Hedge
Scenario 8 ACRE-YP-CM ACRE YP 70% Cash Market
Scenario 9 ACRE-YP-FH ACRE YP 70% Futures Hedge
1 Government Program-Crop Insurance Product-Marketing Strategy
Noted with corresponding levels of coverage.
2 DCP = Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program
  ACRE  = Average Crop Revenue Election
3 RP 70% = Revenue Protection 70%
  YP 70%= Yield Protection 70%
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strategy in marketing of grain.  Setting price protection at different levels remains a 
process reflecting a producer’s cost of production, personal perception, and anticipation 
of future events.  Also, placement of options remains subjective depending upon strike 
prices and premium values or costs for a particular commodity.  CM or a FH are less 
complicated to place and carryout for simulation scenario design.  These two alternatives 
remain feasible alternatives when attempting to evaluate the effects of basic marketing 
strategies.   
Under the CM alternative, producers are assumed to sell the entire simulated 
production at the state MYA price.  Common hedging practices limit the amount of grain 
marketed before harvest in a particular production year up to the crop insurance 
guarantee and therefore, placing a hedge involving 70% of the expected yield would fit 
within industry standards.  Based upon this reasoning, the two marketing strategies for 
analysis include cash marketing all production or hedging 70% of expected yield 
equivalent at the 30-day planting-time average futures price for a particular commodity, 
lifting the hedge at harvest time, and subsequently selling the actual production at the 
state MYA price. 
All scenarios use the same starting 2011 expected yield projections and planting-
time price averages.  Also, guarantees for government programs and crop insurance 
products are consistent with those available during the 2011 production year.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Results from the stochastic simulation serve as the foundation of analysis and 
conclusions to draw recommendations for producers.  Depending upon risk preferences 
and financial conditions, an individual’s preferred strategy may vary.  Since attitudes and 
preferences vary amongst producers, one single methodology cannot represent the 
decision-making standard for everyone.  The goal and scope of this analysis focuses on 
determining how the optimal choice varies across different evaluation standards.  
Indirectly, the level of variability expressed across different regions of the state may 
affect estimates of risk and the optimal strategy depending upon an individual producer’s 
location.   
4.1 Overview of Analysis Methods 
 Multiple methods exist to examine stochastic financial simulations.  Each 
approach has various advantages and disadvantages with corresponding assumptions 
utilized to analyze a particular scenario.  The five procedures utilized in this analysis 
include: Expected Value (EV), Coefficient of Variation (CV), Stochastic Dominance 
(SD), StopLight charts, and SERF.  Each section evaluates the various assumptions 
necessary to employ one of the five stochastic procedures.  Based upon these parameters, 
each analysis highlights the optimal scenario for a given farm and implications on the 
selection of risk management strategies across the state.   
4.2 Results 
 The following stochastic analysis follows the order of EV, CV, SD, StopLight 
charts, and SERF.  Within each section the optimal choice will be highlighted in a table 
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format along with a summary of each procedure in the conclusion.  References in 
Appendices A through D provide additional results for each analysis from which a 
section’s condensed tables or figures are drawn.      
4.2.1 Expected Value 
 An EV represents the mean under a specific statistical distribution given a set of 
probabilities for occurrences involving each specific event.  When applied to one of the 
nine different simulation scenarios for a particular representative farm, an EV indicates 
the anticipated average gross farm revenue under a specific alternative for each farm.  
This mean is the average gross farm revenue over the 500 randomized draws where each 
event has the same statistical probability of occurring for a specific scenario.  In the case 
of expected gross farm revenue, the highest EV represents the most desired outcome.  
Gross farm revenue in the following analysis refers to income adjusted for net crop 
insurance and marketing costs.     
Table 4.1 Expected Gross Farm Revenue by Representative Farm under Simulation 
Scenarios 
 
 Statistics provided in Table 4.1 highlight the expected gross farm revenue for the 
eight representative farms in Nebraska under the nine alternative simulation scenarios.  
The highest EV by representative farm includes: DCP-RP-CM for District 10, 
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm $604,574 $644,894 $641,226 $643,533 $639,865 $640,624 $636,956 $639,263 $635,595
District 20 Farm 1,359,031 1,401,590 1,411,524 1,402,079 1,412,012 1,395,248 1,405,182 1,395,736 1,405,670
District 30 Farm 1,007,463 1,032,497 1,036,303 1,031,480 1,035,286 1,028,682 1,032,488 1,027,665 1,031,472
District 50 Farm 1,190,801 1,229,695 1,239,896 1,229,884 1,240,086 1,224,142 1,234,343 1,224,332 1,234,533
District 60 Farm 900,449 935,833 939,096 933,758 937,022 931,515 934,778 929,441 932,704
District 70 Farm 1,175,721 1,232,241 1,238,018 1,230,367 1,236,144 1,225,559 1,231,336 1,223,685 1,229,462
District 80 Farm 1,136,410 1,172,856 1,177,524 1,172,099 1,176,767 1,167,120 1,171,788 1,166,364 1,171,032
District 90 Farm 946,216 988,838 991,511 986,875 989,548 984,143 986,817 982,180 984,854
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
Risk Management Scenarios1Representative 
Farm
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DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 60, 70, 80, and 90.  
A basic conclusion from the EV analysis shows participating in any of the risk 
management strategies provides larger expected gross farm revenue than the base 
scenario of NP-NI-CM.  Also, none of the four scenarios containing ACRE were 
preferred using the EV procedure.   
Table 4.2 Expected Gross Farm Revenue per Acre by Representative Farm under 
Simulation Scenarios 
 
 Analyzing the expected gross farm revenue on a per acre basis in Table 4.2 
provides the same results as given in Table 4.1.  Per acre average revenue comes from the 
expected gross farm revenue divided by the total number of cropland acres per farm.  
Evaluating per acre revenue shows how the anticipated revenue varies across the state 
due to cropping practices and productivity differences with expected revenue typically 
lower in the western, more arid regions of the state. 
 One limitation of the EV procedure is the inability to take into consideration the 
variability of gross farm revenue.  Some producers may be more receptive to reducing 
revenue variability.  The ability of producers to tolerate revenue losses may be subject to 
the level of variability in farm revenue when suffering yield or price declines.  When 
analyzing gross farm revenue with a CV measurement, a level of variability may be 
defined for the set of risk management strategies.   
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm $484.70 $517.03 $514.09 $515.94 $512.99 $513.60 $510.66 $512.51 $509.57
District 20 Farm 986.72 1,017.62 1,024.83 1,017.97 1,025.18 1,013.01 1,020.22 1,013.37 1,020.58
District 30 Farm 948.66 972.23 975.81 971.27 974.86 968.64 972.22 967.68 971.26
District 50 Farm 1,056.14 1,090.63 1,099.68 1,090.80 1,099.85 1,085.71 1,094.76 1,085.88 1,094.92
District 60 Farm 877.83 912.32 915.51 910.30 913.48 908.11 911.30 906.09 909.27
District 70 Farm 732.84 768.07 771.67 766.90 770.50 763.91 767.51 762.74 766.34
District 80 Farm 946.39 976.74 980.63 976.11 980.00 971.97 975.85 971.34 975.22
District 90 Farm 782.42 817.67 819.88 816.04 818.26 813.79 816.00 812.16 814.37
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
Representative 
Farm
Risk Management Scenarios1
55 
 
 
4.2.2 Coefficient of Variation 
 The CV measures the proportion of the standard deviation to the mean for a set of 
data.  A standard deviation measures the dispersion of a set of data from the mean.  When 
interpreting the CV over a set of scenarios, the smallest percentage value indicates the 
distribution with the least variation relative to the mean.  Producers seeking the lowest 
revenue variability relative to the mean across the set of scenarios would choose the 
outcome with the lowest CV value.  The lowest CV measurement may or may not have 
the highest expected value.     
Table 4.3 Expected Gross Farm Revenue (GFR) and Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
by Representative Farm under Simulation Scenarios  
  
 CV values for the eight representative farms under the nine different simulation 
scenarios are displayed in Table 4.3.  Further detail on the minimums, maximums, and 
standard deviations of the revenue distributions may be viewed in Table A.1 of 
Appendix A.  Analysis of Table 4.3 shows the lowest CV for all representative farms as 
Variable2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm  GFR ($) 604,574 644,894 641,226 643,533 639,865 640,624 636,956 639,263 635,595
CV (%) 26.61 20.71 19.81 21.29 20.38 20.83 19.93 21.41 20.50
District 20 Farm  GFR ($) 1,359,031 1,401,590 1,411,524 1,402,079 1,412,012 1,395,248 1,405,182 1,395,736 1,405,670
CV (%) 21.90 19.11 17.50 19.44 17.81 19.19 17.58 19.52 17.89
District 30 Farm  GFR ($) 1,007,463 1,032,497 1,036,303 1,031,480 1,035,286 1,028,682 1,032,488 1,027,665 1,031,472
CV (%) 17.50 15.96 14.38 16.21 14.59 16.00 14.42 16.26 14.63
District 50 Farm  GFR ($) 1,190,801 1,229,695 1,239,896 1,229,884 1,240,086 1,224,142 1,234,343 1,224,332 1,234,533
CV (%) 22.47 19.31 17.90 19.76 18.29 19.40 17.97 19.85 18.37
District 60 Farm  GFR ($) 900,449 935,833 939,096 933,758 937,022 931,515 934,778 929,441 932,704
CV (%) 17.31 14.81 13.26 15.23 13.58 14.87 13.31 15.30 13.63
District 70 Farm  GFR ($) 1,175,721 1,232,241 1,238,018 1,230,367 1,236,144 1,225,559 1,231,336 1,223,685 1,229,462
CV (%) 21.75 17.72 16.82 18.31 17.32 17.82 16.91 18.41 17.42
District 80 Farm  GFR ($) 1,136,410 1,172,856 1,177,524 1,172,099 1,176,767 1,167,120 1,171,788 1,166,364 1,171,032
CV (%) 16.76 14.83 13.47 15.15 13.73 14.90 13.53 15.22 13.79
District 90 Farm  GFR ($) 946,216 988,838 991,511 986,875 989,548 984,143 986,817 982,180 984,854
CV (%) 18.11 15.22 14.10 15.54 14.35 15.29 14.16 15.60 14.41
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 GFR = Expected Gross Farm Revenue
    CV = Coefficient of Variation
Representative 
Farm
Risk Management Scenarios1
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DCP-RP-FH.  This is counter to the EV analysis for some districts, where the most 
optimal outcomes for representative farms were DCP-RP-CM in District 10 and 
DCP-YP-FH in District 20 and 50.  EV for these farms and scenarios have higher 
monetary values, but also have higher CV.  In comparison to gross farm revenue, the 
differences are relatively small, but show a fundamental difference in the two procedures. 
 Reducing revenue variability versus seeking the highest expected value introduces 
probability in forming confidence intervals of revenue distributions.  Having the lowest 
coefficient of variation in one of the nine scenarios shows the operation may have the 
least variability, but may limit beneficial movements in commodity price with a futures 
hedge.  For certain operations, the least variability in gross farm revenue may be the most 
desired.  Coupling distributional probabilities with expected values presents another 
manner in which to analyze the nine scenarios.  SD represents the methodology to 
evaluate the probability and expected value of a distribution under a given risk preference 
which overcomes the limitations of EV and CV.   
4.2.3 Stochastic Dominance  
Analysis tools included under the SD category include FSD, SDS, and SDRF.  In 
the FSD methodology the basic assumption is that the risk taker prefers more money to 
less (Richardson & Outlaw, 2008).  When related to probability theory, this concept 
implies a scenario with the highest likelihood to occur when the scenarios are ranked on a 
CDF chart.  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure 4.1 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 70 for 
Alternative Scenarios 1  
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As an example CDF chart, Figure 4.1 displays the nine simulation scenarios for 
the representative farm in District 70 with the corresponding statistical probability and 
ranking of each alternative.  Refer to Appendix B containing Figures B.1 through B.8 for 
the CDF charts involving all eight representative farms.  An approximation for the 
probability of receiving a certain level of gross farm revenue or less under a given 
scenario may be identified by locating dollar value on the x-axis, tracing vertically up to 
the appropriate CDF curve, and then following horizontally over to the corresponding 
probability on the y-axis. FSD shows the most preferred scenario as the alternative 
furthest to the right on CDF chart, which has the largest probability of obtaining the 
greatest level of farm revenue.   
Analysis of Figures B.1 through B.8 in Appendix B shows a similar pattern to the 
CDF of Figure 4.1.  In all of the CDFs, the ability to identify one scenario FSD to the 
other alternatives is not possible.  FSD requires all elements of a particular scenario to not 
overlap an opposing alterative when graphed on a CDF chart.  Clearly overlap occurs for 
the nine alternative risk management scenarios.  One interesting point to note regarding 
the CDF charts involves the NP-NI-CM scenario which does not utilize an active crop 
insurance product or government program.  The horizontal distance between the 
NP-NI-CM scenarios and the opposing scenarios may be attributed to DPs and subsidized 
crop yield or revenue insurance. 
FSD does not provide an optimal recommendation for the representative farms 
because of the overlaps in the gross farm revenue CDFs involving the nine alternative 
scenarios.  SDS methodology overcomes the limitations of FSD, but requires two major 
assumptions.  First, the technique assumes the decision-maker has constant absolute risk 
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aversion with decreasing preferences for more risky alternatives.  Secondly, this process 
disregards a decision-maker’s utility function.  Also, SDS has to rank all of the possible 
pairs of risk management scenarios which may result in an analyzed set with more than 
one optimal outcome (Richardson & Outlaw, 2008).    
 The third stochastic dominance procedure relevant to analysis of CDF charts 
incorporates utility.  SDRF couples SDS with utility by introducing constant RACs.  
Lower and upper RAC values are set according to an individual’s risk preference.  
Problems with this process occur when the decision-maker has preferences which are 
different for the lower and upper RAC values, as more than one optimal outcome may 
exist in a set of alternatives.  Similar to SDS, all pairwise correlations of the simulation 
scenarios must be analyzed and could result in an efficient set being very small 
(Richardson & Outlaw, 2008).  Due to these issues, SDS and SDRF do not provide clear 
abilities to analyze the nine different risk management scenarios.      
 CDF charts display the probability of ascertaining a certain level of revenue under 
a particular simulation scenario.  Without a concise stochastic dominance methodology to 
rank these approaches, the shortcomings of EV and CV analysis still present problems.  
The StopLight procedure provides an approach not limited by the issues of SD, yet still 
represents the probability of achieving a defined level of revenue and allows the analysis 
to take into consideration different risk preferences.      
4.2.4 StopLight Charts 
 StopLight charts measure the probability of favorable and unfavorable events 
given critical cut-off values.  These limits are placed according to the decision-maker’s 
preference in financial simulations; the values represent the probability of achieving a 
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certain level of revenue or income.  An appropriate parameter for many revenue purposes 
relates to the ability to cover different types of expenses.  Based upon the probability of 
reaching these levels of income an optimal strategy may be identified depending upon the 
decision-maker’s risk preference.   
 The probabilities of achieving benchmark parameters in a StopLight chart 
correspond to red (unfavorable), yellow (cautionary), and green (favorable) events in a 
bar chart format.  Unfavorable events represent the likelihood of falling below the lower 
cut-off value.  Next, cautionary developments show the probability of an outcome 
occurring between the lower and upper cut-off value.  Finally, the favorable events 
happen when the simulation draw exceeds the upper cut-off value (Outlaw and 
Richardson, 2008).  Depending upon the critical lower and upper cut-off values used in 
the analysis, the probabilities may change significantly.   
 In general, for risk-averse individuals, the most preferred alternative appears as 
the scenario containing the least red (unfavorable) and most green (favorable).  Using this 
methodology to select the optimal outcome is consistent with utility theory.  Individuals 
are assumed to gain more satisfaction from more revenue compared to less and more 
satisfaction from higher probabilities of achieving critical levels of revenue (Richardson 
& Outlaw, 2008).  StopLight charts combine probability and risk preferences in a manner 
which overcomes the shortcomings of EV, CV, and SD techniques.  For the purpose of 
analyzing the nine alternative risk management scenarios, a set of critical values and 
preferences are constructed from production estimates.   
Approximations for variable and total crop production expenses come from 
USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) ARMS 2009-2010 Annual Cost and Return 
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Estimates for corn, soybeans, and wheat.  These surveys group Nebraska crop producers 
into three different ARMS regions.  The 2009-2010 analysis reports allowed for the 
estimation of variable and total economic costs on a percentage basis of per-acre crop 
production values.  Variable costs include the operating costs of seed, fertilizer, 
chemicals, custom operations, fuel, lube, electricity, repairs, purchases of irrigation 
water, and interest on operating costs.  Total costs include all variable costs in addition to 
hired labor, opportunity costs of unpaid labor, capital recovery of machinery and 
equipment, opportunity costs of land (rental rate), taxes and insurance, and general farm 
overhead (USDA Economic Research Service, 2012).      
Next, expenses for the representative farms are estimated as a percentage of 
expected revenue under the NP-NI-CM scenario on a per acre basis according to the 
ARMS region in which these farms would be found.  By multiplying these estimates by 
the corresponding number of acres by crop type, costs were summed for the entire 
operation.  Approximations for these variable and total economic expenses provide 
critical cut-off values to gauge stochastic gross farm revenues.     
As an example StopLight chart, Figure 4.2 displays the nine simulation scenarios 
for the representative farm in District 70 with lower and upper cut-off values of $699,198 
and $1,131,710.  Refer to Appendix C containing Figures C.1 through C.8 for the 
StopLight charts involving all eight representative farms.  The lower and upper cut-off 
values represent estimated variable and total economic costs of production for the 
representative farm in District 70. 
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Figure 4.2 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 70 for Alternative Scenarios1 
Lower Cut-Off Value 699,198 Upper Cut-Off Value 1,131,710
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
P(U)2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(C) 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.34
P(F) 0.58 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.63 0.66
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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As an example scenario in Figure 4.2, NP-NI-CM shows the distribution of the 
simulated crop revenue distribution without participating in any government programs, 
crop insurance products, or marketing strategies.  Under this scenario, only about a 3.0% 
probability exists of not being able to cover variable expenses and 41% is the probability 
of not meeting total costs.  More interestingly, a 58.0% chance exists of exceeding 
estimated total costs.  The remaining eight scenarios all exceed estimated variable costs 
and do not show any unfavorable (red) regions on the respective bars of the alternatives.   
Assuming each operation has risk-averse preferences, the optimal scenario is the 
one which has the highest probability of exceeding total costs.  In the event two scenarios 
have the same probability of exceeding total costs, the alternative having the higher 
expected value is identified as the optimal outcome.  For the entire set of representative 
farms, DCP-RP-FH serves as the optimal outcome, except for District 50, where 
DCP-YP-FH provides the most desired outcome.  The only difference between the two 
scenarios comes from the crop insurance selection of YP instead of RP in District 50.   
 For further detail on individual StopLight charts of the representative farms, refer 
to Appendix C containing Figures C.1 through C.8.  Each chart in the Appendix C 
represents the StopLight analysis for each farm using estimated variable and total 
expenses for that farm as the lower and upper cut-off critical values.  Table 4.4 provides a 
summary of these charts under the nine different simulation scenarios.  Intervals shown in 
the table represent the likelihood of expected gross farm revenue exceeding total costs, 
greater than variable costs and less than total costs, and falling below variable costs.  
These levels represent the probability of favorable, cautionary, and unfavorable event 
depictions of the StopLight charts in Figures C.1 through C.8. 
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Table 4.4 Expected Gross Farm Revenue (GFR) and StopLight Chart Analysis 
Summarizing Simulation Scenarios 
District 10 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CMDCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $604,574 $644,894 $641,226 $643,533 $639,865 $640,624 $636,956 $639,263 $635,595
Prob(GFR > TC) 66.4% 74.6% 76.8% 74.6% 76.6% 73.4% 76.0% 73.4% 75.6%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 31.8% 25.4% 23.2% 25.4% 23.4% 26.6% 24.0% 26.6% 24.4%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $249,543 Total Costs (TC) = $539,213
District 20 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $1,359,031 $1,401,590 $1,411,524 $1,402,079 $1,412,012 $1,395,248 $1,405,182 $1,395,736 $1,405,670
Prob(GFR > TC) 80.2% 86.6% 86.8% 86.0% 86.4% 84.6% 86.4% 85.2% 85.8%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 19.4% 13.4% 13.2% 14.0% 13.6% 15.4% 13.6% 14.8% 14.2%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $533,515 Total Costs (TC) = $1,089,536
District 30 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $1,007,463 $1,032,497 $1,036,303 $1,031,480 $1,035,286 $1,028,682 $1,032,488 $1,027,665 $1,031,472
Prob(GFR > TC) 89.2% 93.8% 94.8% 93.0% 94.0% 93.4% 94.4% 92.6% 93.6%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 10.8% 6.2% 5.2% 7.0% 6.0% 6.6% 5.6% 7.4% 6.4%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $352,428 Total Costs (TC) = $796,831
District 50 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $1,190,801 $1,229,695 $1,239,896 $1,229,884 $1,240,086 $1,224,142 $1,234,343 $1,224,332 $1,234,533
Prob(GFR > TC) 66.6% 70.0% 73.2% 70.0% 73.2% 69.4% 72.4% 69.4% 72.6%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 32.0% 30.0% 26.8% 30.0% 26.8% 30.6% 27.6% 30.6% 27.4%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $553,746 Total Costs (TC) = $1,078,379
District 60 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $900,449 $935,833 $939,096 $933,758 $937,022 $931,515 $934,778 $929,441 $932,704
Prob(GFR > TC) 88.4% 97.2% 98.2% 96.0% 97.8% 96.6% 98.2% 95.8% 98.0%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 11.6% 2.8% 1.8% 4.0% 2.2% 3.4% 1.8% 4.2% 2.0%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $311,692 Total Costs (TC) = $711,338
District 70 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $1,175,721 $1,232,241 $1,238,018 $1,230,367 $1,236,144 $1,225,559 $1,231,336 $1,223,685 $1,229,462
Prob(GFR > TC) 58.2% 63.6% 66.4% 63.6% 66.2% 62.2% 65.6% 62.6% 65.6%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 38.4% 36.4% 33.6% 36.4% 33.8% 37.8% 34.4% 37.4% 34.4%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $699,198 Total Costs (TC) = $1,131,710
District 80 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $1,136,410 $1,172,856 $1,177,524 $1,172,099 $1,176,767 $1,167,120 $1,171,788 $1,166,364 $1,171,032
Prob(GFR > TC) 68.0% 74.0% 75.2% 74.2% 75.2% 72.6% 74.8% 72.8% 74.4%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 32.0% 26.0% 24.8% 25.8% 24.8% 27.4% 25.2% 27.2% 25.6%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $562,166 Total Costs (TC) = $1,051,547
District 90 Farm
StopLight Cut-Offs2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FHDCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Expected GFR $946,216 $988,838 $991,511 $986,875 $989,548 $984,143 $986,817 $982,180 $984,854
Prob(GFR > TC) 67.4% 80.4% 83.0% 79.8% 81.8% 79.6% 82.0% 78.4% 81.0%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC) 32.4% 19.6% 17.0% 20.2% 18.2% 20.4% 18.0% 21.6% 19.0%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC) 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Critical Values Variable Costs (VC) = $408,343 Total Costs (TC) = $855,988
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 GFR = Gross Farm Revenue
    VC = Variable Costs including estimated seed, fertilizer, chemicals, custom operations, fuel, lube, electricity, repairs, purchased irrigation water, 
            and interests on operating capital expenses.
   TC = Total Costs include variable and estimated hired labor, opportunity cost of unpaid labor, capital recovery of machinery and equipment, 
             opportunity costs of land (rental rate), taxes, insurance, and general farm overhead expenses. 
Risk Management Scenarios1
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 General observations show the probability of expected gross farm revenue falling 
below variable costs is negligible for 2011.  Given starting yield and price scenario 
baselines, the amount of simulated gross crop revenue has an extremely low probability 
of not being able to cover variable costs.  Risk management scenarios excluding the 
NP-NI-CM alternative show participating in one of these arrangements allows for 
guarantees to exceed all estimated variable costs for all eight representative farms.   
 Results vary considerably on the probability of these operations covering variable 
expenses, but not covering total costs.  Several factors contribute to this result, including 
crop mix and production practices modeled for each representative farm.  As an example, 
those representative farms with more irrigated acres and those located in the eastern 
portion of the state have less simulated negative revenue outcomes compared to those of 
the western panhandle.  Similar results exist for the likelihood of exceeding total costs.  
 StopLight charts provide a stochastic analysis procedure which couples 
probability and expected outcomes together.  Some shortcomings of previous analysis 
tools including EV, CV, and SD are overcome by the StopLight chart analysis.  One 
assumption limiting the StopLight analysis comes from the constant risk aversion 
assumption.  Being able to evaluate risk preferences over a range of different preferences 
and drawing references from these depictions is a fundamental goal of this analysis.  
Similar to SDRF, SERF allows for the ranking of multiple scenarios over different risk 
preferences given a defined level of wealth.    
4.2.5 Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
 SERF analyzes stochastic scenarios given a particular range of risk preferences 
and wealth.  Unlike SDRF which requires a specified risk aversion level, SERF allows 
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for the ranking of multiple scenarios typically ranging from a neutral to extremely risk-
averse range.  Results can then be ranked according to the particular risk aversion class 
(Richardson & Outlaw, 2008).  Also, across the general classes of preferences summaries 
may be drawn regarding the performance of the nine risk management scenarios.   
 The range of risk preferences ranked by the SERF analysis includes risk neutral 
and slightly, normally, moderately, and extremely risk averse.  These classes either rank 
preferences in SERF according to RAC or Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients (ARAC).  
The difference between the two coefficients involves the assumptions behind the levels of 
wealth.  RAC ranks preferences according to a relative or generalized level, whereas 
ARAC accounts for the decision-maker’s level of wealth.  In the case of the 
representative farms, the level of wealth (assets) is estimated for ARAC values to use in 
the SERF analysis. 
 Approximations for asset values on each of the eight representative farms come 
from the average asset turnover ratio in Nebraska.  This ratio comes from the weighted 
summation of income and assets on farms with a gross farm income classification above 
$100,000 in the USDA ERS ARMS Farm Financial and Crop Production Practices: Farm 
Structure and Finance 2010-2011 data in Nebraska.  These operations represent producers 
in all eight NASS-ASDs (USDA Economic Research Service, 2011).  Dividing these two 
summed values equates to an average asset turnover rate of 25.23% in Nebraska during 
the 2010 production year.  Income and asset values during the 2010 production year 
represent comparable economic forces as those expected in 2011 allowing for this value 
to serve as a comparable approximation.      
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 Applying the average asset turnover ratio to each representative farm’s expected 
gross income under the NP-NI-CM scenario generates estimated asset values reflecting 
the size and scope of each operation.  SERF analysis uses these estimates to establish a 
level of wealth in calculating the ARAC values.  To generate the ARAC values, the 
constant relative RAC for each respective preference level was divided by the estimated 
wealth level for each individual farm.  The constant relative RAC values include 0 for 
risk neutral and 0.5 for slightly, 1 for normally, 2 for moderately, and 4 for extremely risk 
averse.  
 Based upon the range of ARAC values, the SERF procedure ranks the Certainty 
Equivalents (CEs) for each scenario on the representative farm.  A CE represents the sum 
of wealth necessary to achieve a particular level of utility under a negative exponential 
utility function.  This equation takes into consideration a particular wealth and ARAC 
value when estimating the utility achieved under a particular risk preference (Richardson 
and Outlaw, 2008).  The resulting SERF chart ranks each alternative risk management 
scenario under the range of specified ARAC values.  For a given ARAC level, the most 
desired alterative is the one with highest CE value.  The vertical difference between two 
particular lines on a SERF chart represents the level of wealth that would need to be 
added to the lower CE scenario to generate utility equal to the higher CE scenario. 
 As an example SERF chart, Figure 4.3 displays the nine alternative risk 
management scenarios under a negative exponential utility function with ARAC values 
ranging from 0 (risk neutral) to 0.0000009 (extremely risk averse) for the representative 
farm of District 70.  Refer to Appendix D containing Figures D.1 through D.8 for the 
SERF charts involving each of the eight representative farms.  Figure 4.3 shows the 
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DCP-RP-FH (light blue line) alternative ranks as the optimal strategy across all ARAC 
preferences.  This scenario achieves the highest CE values under each ARAC position.  
Next, the DCP-YP-FH scenario ranks second under this particular SERF analysis.   
  Scenarios do not rank the same across all risk preferences if one risk 
management CE equation crosses another risk management CE equation.  As an example 
in Figure 4.3 when determining the third and fourth most desired outcomes, the utility 
function for the DCP-RP-CM and ACRE-RP-FH cross approximately half-way through 
the ARAC spectrum.  For approximately the first half of the ARACs (less risk-averse) the 
DCP-RP-CM ranks as the third most preferred, but when ACRE-RP-FH crosses above 
this scenario the second alternative then has higher preferences (among more risk-averse 
ARACs).  The ability of different utility functions to cross in a SERF chart highlights that 
a given optimal choice ranking is relative for a particular position on the ARAC 
spectrum.  Analysis of how the optimal choice varies across the range of RAC values can 
still provide insight on the general performance of a particular scenario.   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure 4.3 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 70 for 
Alternative Scenarios1 
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Table 4.5 summarizes the eight figures of D.1 through D.8 in Appendix D 
involving the SERF analyses of the eight representative farm simulation scenarios.  Each 
summary ranks the nine risk management scenarios for a given risk preference and 
ARAC value.  These rankings sorted the alternatives by assigning those with the highest 
CE the greatest preference.  The optimal choice and ranking of the scenarios varies 
depending upon the preference and representative farm.  CEs displayed with the negative 
exponential utility functions cross periodically in analysis.  When drawing an overall 
summary of Table 4.5, a specific ARAC level must be defined or assumptions regarding 
the crossing inverse utility functions have to be taken into consideration to define the 
optimal set of strategies.    
For individual risk preferences and associated ARAC levels, the SERF procedure 
appropriately identifies the dominant strategy for each alternative choice.  Trying to rank 
the optimal strategy for each individual farm causes conflicting results due to crossing 
CE lines in District 20 and 50.  Only three cases involving these two representative farms 
exist where the CE lines cross for the optimal choice.  Assuming the most desired risk 
management choice is the alternative which has the most number-one rankings across the 
five ARAC levels in each farm analysis allows for identification of an optimal strategy. 
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Table 4.5 Representative Farms Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
(SERF) Summaries for Alternative Scenarios 
 
District 10 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8
Slightly 0.0000002 9 1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8
Normal 0.0000004 9 1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8
Moderately 0.0000008 9 1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8
Extremely 0.0000017 9 1 3 2 5 4 7 6 8
District 20 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 6 2 5 1 8 4 7 3
Slightly 0.0000001 9 6 2 5 1 8 4 7 3
Normal 0.0000002 9 6 2 5 1 8 4 7 3
Moderately 0.0000004 9 5 2 6 1 7 4 8 3
Extremely 0.0000007 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
District 30 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
Slightly 0.0000001 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
Normal 0.0000002 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
Moderately 0.0000005 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
Extremely 0.0000010 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
District 50 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 6 2 5 1 8 4 7 3
Slightly 0.0000001 9 6 2 5 1 8 4 7 3
Normal 0.0000002 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
Moderately 0.0000004 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
Extremely 0.0000008 9 5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
District 60 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Slightly 0.0000001 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Normal 0.0000003 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Moderately 0.0000006 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
Extremely 0.0000011 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
District 70 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Slightly 0.0000001 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Normal 0.0000002 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Moderately 0.0000004 9 3 1 6 2 7 4 8 5
Extremely 0.0000009 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
District 80 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 3 1 4 2 7 5 8 6
Slightly 0.0000001 9 3 1 4 2 7 5 8 6
Normal 0.0000002 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Moderately 0.0000004 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Extremely 0.0000009 9 4 1 6 2 7 3 8 5
District 90 Farm 
Risk Preference ARAC2 NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Neutral 0.0000000 9 3 1 4 2 7 5 8 6
Slightly 0.0000001 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Normal 0.0000003 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Moderately 0.0000005 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
Extremely 0.0000011 9 3 1 5 2 7 4 8 6
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 ARAC = Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient.  Refer to Richardson and Outlaw (2009) for further discussion on ARAC.
Risk Management Scenarios1
72 
 
 
 Observations drawn from Table 4.5 with the given assumptions and limitations 
show the optimal choices include: DCP-RP-CM for District 10, DCP-YP-FH for District 
20, and DCP-RP-FH for Districts 30 through 90.  Once again not participating in any 
government programs, crop insurance products, or marketing strategies represented by 
the NP-NI-CM scenario provides the least desired alternative consistently across all 
preferences and outcomes.  Ranking of alternatives between the most- and least-desired 
management scenarios shows mixed results.   
 Limitations and shortcomings posed by the EV, CV, SD, and StopLight analysis 
procedures are overcome with the SERF methodology given certain assumptions and 
limitations.  SERF allows for the ranking of revenue distributions through the use of 
expected values, variability of revenue, and different risk preferences.  One single 
methodology cannot provide the exclusive means to analyze simulation results without 
shortcomings.  SERF provided the most effective procedure given the scope of the 
analysis, but drawing inferences from the previous four procedures is still valuable.      
4.3 Summary of Results 
 Five different analysis procedures including EV, CV, SD, StopLight and SERF 
were used to analyze the nine different simulation scenarios across the eight 
representative farms.  From the analysis, an optimal set of alternatives were identified 
under each procedure.  SD techniques either provided inconsistent techniques or did not 
meet the needs of this analysis and their results are not included in the following 
summary.  Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 present the results from the four remaining 
procedures utilized.     
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4.3.1 Summary of Strategies 
 Table 4.6 presents the summary of the optimal scenarios involving the EV, CV, 
StopLight, and SERF analysis.  The optimal strategy for each farm under each analysis 
procedure is denoted with the number one.  Also, each scenario’s total is summed across 
the eight representative farms in each analysis.  These totals are then displayed in Figure 
4.4 as a bar chart depiction.    
 At the most basic analysis level in Table 4.6, the EV procedure’s optimal choice 
was the scenario producing the highest average expected gross farm revenue.  Results 
showed the highest EV by scenario and representative farm included: DCP-RP-CM for 
District 10, DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 60, 70, 
80, and 90.  These results indicated that the alternatives involving the DCP as the 
government program choice and RP as the crop insurance product had the greatest 
preference for the representative farms.  Another element of risk farms are concerned 
about involves the variability of revenue, which the EV procedure does not take into 
consideration when analyzing the alternative scenarios.     
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Table 4.6 Summary of Preferred Stochastic Results for Representative Farms under 
Alternative Scenarios 
 
 CV overcomes some of the limitations imposed by the EV analysis by combining 
the mean and standard deviation of gross farm revenue.  With this evaluation process, the 
alternative showing the lowest CV provides the least relative revenue variability on a 
Expected Gross
Farm Revenue (GFR)
Region NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm 1
District 20 Farm 1
District 30 Farm 1
District 50 Farm 1
District 60 Farm 1
District 70 Farm 1
District 80 Farm 1
District 90 Farm 1
Total 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 0 0
Coefficient of Variation (CV)
Region NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm 1
District 20 Farm 1
District 30 Farm 1
District 50 Farm 1
District 60 Farm 1
District 70 Farm 1
District 80 Farm 1
District 90 Farm 1
Total 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
StopLight Charts
Region NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm 1
District 20 Farm 1
District 30 Farm 1
District 50 Farm 1
District 60 Farm 1
District 70 Farm 1
District 80 Farm 1
District 90 Farm 1
Total 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0
Stochastic Efficiency with Respects to a Function (SERF)
Region NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm 1
District 20 Farm 1
District 30 Farm 1
District 50 Farm 1
District 60 Farm 1
District 70 Farm 1
District 80 Farm 1
District 90 Farm 1
Total 0 1 6 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
Risk Management Scenarios1
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farm.  The DCP-RP-FH alternative proved to be the optimal scenario across all farms for 
the CV analysis as Table 4.6 summarizes.  However the CV did not determine the 
optimal choice on all of the representative farms to necessarily have the highest EV.  
Under that analysis DCP-RP-CM in District 10 and DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50 
provided the most desired results.  These scenarios provided slightly higher anticipated 
averages under the set of alternatives available by $3,668 in District 10, $488 in District 
20, and $190 in District 50.  Although negligible in value when compared to the overall 
expected gross farm revenue, the results still present a fundamental difference between 
the two methodologies.   
 Solely relying on the highest EV or lowest CV does not take into consideration 
the probability of achieving a certain level of revenue.  SD involves FSD, SDS, and 
SDRF that allows for the ranking of stochastic distributions under various probability 
levels and assumptions.  Analysis of the CDF charts showed each representative farm’s 
revenue distribution under one scenario overlaps multiple times with another alternative, 
which eliminates the FSD and SDS methodologies from analyzing the revenue 
distributions.  SDRF could analyze the various scenarios, but requires a predefined RAC 
level that only encompasses one particular risk aversion level.   
 Shortcomings introduced by EV, CV, or SD provided the motivation to consider 
other analysis procedures.  StopLight charts introduced a methodology to evaluate the 
probability of achieving different levels of revenue involving a stochastic distribution.  
Critical cut-off values established under this process represented estimated variable and 
total crop production expenses.  The optimal choice with this process involved the 
outcome with the highest probability of covering total crop production expenses.  Table 
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4.6 indicates that the DCP-RP-FH served as the optimal strategy for all representative 
farms except District 10 where the preferred alternative was DCP-YP-FH.  Although 
each individual can interpret each StopLight chart independently, the scope of the 
analysis seeks to rank different risk management scenarios for a variety of risk 
preferences. 
 Introduced as the final technique to analyze the nine stochastic scenarios, SERF 
allowed for the ranking of different alternatives and risk preferences.  Each farm had a 
level of assets estimated to determine the ARACs necessary for the SERF analysis.  
Preferences established from the ARACs ranged from risk neutral to extremely risk 
averse.  Under this procedure the optimal scenario was identified as the one with the 
highest rank across all of the preferences.  Under the SERF analysis, optimum scenarios 
by the representative farms included: DCP-RP-CM for District 10, DCP-YP-FH in 
District 20 and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 as shown in Table 4.6.     
4.3.2 Implications for Nebraska 
 Individual farm-level stochastic analysis results presented in Table 4.6 were 
compiled to draw overall summaries involving all of the procedures.  From these results, 
the bar chart in Figure 4.4 presents the optimal strategies given the EV, CV, StopLight 
charts and SERF analysis.  Definite trends may be observed from the overall performance 
of these programs across the set of representative farms. 
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
2 GFR = Expected Gross Farm Revenue, CV = Coefficient of Variation, StopLight = StopLight 
charts, and SERF = Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
Figure 4.4 Bar Chart Depiction of Preferred Stochastic Results for Representative 
Farms under Alternative Scenarios1  
 Overall, Figure 4.4 shows the DCP-RP-FH scenario provided the greatest number 
of optimal outcomes across the four different stochastic analysis procedures and across 
the eight representative farms.  All representative farms were better off participating in a 
scenario involving a government program and crop insurance product instead of the 
NP-NI-CM alternative.  One can ascertain from this result that participating in a 
government program and purchasing a crop insurance policy increases and stabilizes 
gross farm revenue to a degree.  Several reasons may explain and suggest why 
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participating in the various risk management strategies provides greater protection to a 
representative farm’s revenue.   
 As part of the Farm Bill through the end of the 2012 crop production year, 
producers may choose to either participate in DCP or ACRE.  Either of these programs 
have DPs, which distributes direct monetary payments based upon historical base acres 
and yields.  DPs under ACRE are at a reduced rate, but in either case monetary payments 
received by the operations are a guaranteed source of income subject to FSA compliance 
requirements.  Implications for crop producers are that participation in DCP or ACRE is 
beneficial to their gross farm revenue.  
 Another observation from Figure 4.4 shows participation in scenarios involving 
DCP are more desired over the ACRE alternative for the representative farms.  The 
performance of these programs is influenced greatly by the yield and price distributions 
simulated in the model.  Price and yield expectations during the 2011 production year are 
considerably higher than guarantees or price support levels established under the ACRE 
and DCPs.  While ACRE had guarantees closer to price expectations of 2011 when 
compared to the DCP supports, the risk reduction effects gained with this program do not 
exceed the reduction in DPs.  Recommendations drawn on this analysis regarding current 
government program options suggest the DCP program outperforms ACRE under current 
price and yield expectations and variability levels expressed in the representative farm 
model.  Commodity programs provided through the USDA FSA beyond 2012 remain 
unknown, but serve as an area for future research.   
 Figure 4.4 shows that beside the most preferable scenario of DCP-RP-FH, the 
DCP-YP-FH and DCP-RP-CM alternatives are the second and third most desirable 
79 
 
 
outcomes but were far behind.  Representative farms in Districts 30, 60, 70, 80, and 90 
had results consistently picking the DCP-RP-FH scenario as the optimal outcome.  The 
only difference for the representative farms in Districts 20 and 50 selecting the 
DCP-YP-FH scenario as the most preferred scenario relates to the crop insurance choice 
of RP versus YP in the risk management strategy.  Also, the optimal outcome 
DCP-RP-CM for District 10 differs from the DCP-RP-FH by using a CM strategy instead 
of a FH.  This summary shows that the representative farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50 act 
as the outliers in the analysis. 
 Differences between the expected gross farm revenue of the DCP-RP-FH scenario 
and optimal strategies identified in Districts 10, 20, and 50’s representative farms amount 
to $3,668, $488, and $190.  In relative comparison to the expected gross farm revenue, 
these amounts are small and insignificant.  Still, evaluating the difference in marketing 
strategies or crop insurance products provides some explanation.  Underlying acreage 
distributions and yield expectations across the three farms lead to the differences in 
performance of these strategies.   
 NASS-ASDs 10, 20, and 50 lie in the western, north central, and central regions 
of Nebraska.  The representative farm in District 10 has unique cropland acres in 
comparison to the other eight operations.  Similar to other representative farms in size, 
District 10’s representative farm has approximately 30 and 70 percent of the cropland 
acres in corn and winter wheat respectively.  District 20’s representative farm has a 
cropland acreage distribution of 65, 24, and 11 percent involving irrigated corn, irrigated 
soybeans, and dryland corn respectively.  Also, the representative farm in District 50 
follows a similar distribution where 71, 18, and 11 percent of the land is in irrigated corn, 
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irrigated soybeans, and dryland corn once again.  The location of these representative 
farm districts and distribution of total cropland acres varies from the five other farms.  
 The representative farm in District 10 with a negative FH gain under the 
DCP-RP-FH scenario leads to stronger performance of CM with the DCP-RP-CM 
alternative.  Evaluation of the base planting-time average futures price versus harvest-
time average futures price shows on average the winter wheat contract ends higher for 
hard red winter wheat, but only slightly lower for corn.  These differences show the 
futures hedge loss and gain for the two crops raised on the representative farm partially 
offset each other, but in net end up with a loss.  Several reasons may lead to the notably 
higher average hard red winter wheat futures harvest price.  Contract performance, 
liquidity, and the number of market participants may influence the historical price 
deviations and ultimately lead to the higher harvest-time prices.   
 Finally, YP under the DCP-YP-FH strategy outperforms RP in the DCP-RP-FH 
alternative on the representative farms in Districts 20 and 50.  In each case either 
representative farm has about 90% of the total cropland acres irrigated.  Assuming the 
crop insurance premium rates are actuarially fair, representative farms should prefer the 
RP crop insurance policy due to the rate of government subsidization and methodology 
used to calibrate farm-level yield variability.  
  RP and YP crop insurance have subsidization rates at levels greater than 50 
percent of the policy.  Assuming farm-level yield deviations are calibrated appropriately, 
producers should choose the product providing the greatest level of protection being RP.  
YP only provides protection to yield losses, whereas RP covers both yield and price risk 
which encompasses both systemic and idiosyncratic elements.  The relatively small 
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differences in expected revenue between the two scenarios show a producer would be just 
about as well off to participate in the DCP-RP-FH.  Also, since both farms encompass 
predominately irrigated practices, this leads to lower yield risk, but little protection from 
systemic price shocks.  A risk-averse operation would prefer the greater level of 
protection with the DCP-RP-FH instead of the DCP-YP-FH.   
 In summary, the DCP-RP-FH strategy serves as the dominant strategy across the 
majority of representative farms given price and yield expectations of 2011.  Simulation 
procedures utilized to evaluate the results included: EV, CV, SD, StopLight, and SERF.  
These procedures did show that the optimal strategy did not carry through to all of the 
procedures for representative farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50.  Differences were 
negligible in comparison to overall farm revenue.  Unique yield and price parameters of 
these farms may have led to the differences.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Summaries drawn from the stochastic simulation assist producers with decision 
making involving crop production across Nebraska.  As risk management tools progress 
over time, so will the strategies employed by producers.  This progression creates the 
need for further research.  The scope of this analysis focused on evaluating risk 
management strategies encompassing government programs, crop insurance products, 
and marketing strategies for the 2011 production year.     
5.1 Conclusions and Implications 
The following section summarizes major contributions and results found by the 
research proceedings.  Initial motivations (Chapter 1) focused the direction of the 
literature review (Chapter 2).  These references provided the foundation to design the 
correlated model for simulating alternative risk management strategies (Chapter 3).  
Analysis procedures involving EV, CV, SD, StopLight charts, and SERF allowed for 
ranking of the stochastic results (Chapter 4) across different representative farms to 
obtain conclusions regarding the performance of these strategies.  Implications may be 
drawn for producer-level decision making across Nebraska.  Although focused to a 
specific set of tools and yield and price expectations related to the 2011 production year, 
results provide insight on risk management strategies and decision making.  The results 
also suggest areas for future research and policy discussions.   
5.1.1 Motivation and Objectives  
As a leader in the agricultural industry, farmers in Nebraska face unique farm-
specific (idiosyncratic) and wide-spread (systemic) risk elements influencing crop yields 
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and correlated prices.  Also, Chapter 1 identified relevant government programs, crop 
insurance products, and marketing strategies available to producers to deal with adverse 
declines in crop revenue.  Combining underlying risk elements with available 
management tools provided the motivation for the research.  The goal and scope of the 
analysis was to design a correlated model which would represent the scale and diversity 
of crop producers across the state and stochastically simulate crop revenue distributions 
with related programs or products.  From the set of risk management strategies and 
representative farms depicted in the model, conclusions were drawn regarding the 
performance of these programs across regions of different variability in Nebraska.   
5.1.2 Review of Literature and Model 
 To accomplish the report’s objectives, literature reviewed in Chapter 2 provided 
insight on risk management tools available for crop production along with direction on 
previous research involving farm-level modeling in Nebraska.  Risk management tools 
fall into the classification of government programs, crop insurance products, or marketing 
strategies.  The 2008 Farm Bill reauthorized traditional income support programs like 
ML, DP, and CCP tied to price.  ACRE was also introduced in the 2008 legislation and 
ties support to crop revenue guarantees.  At the producer level, operations must decide 
whether to participate in CCP or ACRE, but receive a reduced DP rate when selecting 
ACRE.   
 Crop insurance administered by the USDA-RMA includes YP, RP, and RP-HPE.  
These programs base guarantees off either yield or revenue involving an APH yield and 
planting- or harvest-time average futures prices.  A variety of marketing strategies exist 
by using futures or option contracts traded on public exchanges for protection against 
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declines in commodity prices.  At the most basic level hedging with futures or options are 
feasible alternatives to cash marketing for producers.  The interactions of the various 
tools are not mutually exclusive as literature cites the scope of protection that guards 
against price, revenue, or production risk at the farm, area, or national level.   
 A review of previous studies shows substantial evaluation of individual 
components of the risk management portfolio at the producer level, but not an evaluation 
of a cohesive combination of the tools.  These studies did however provide insight on the 
performance and shortcomings of each individual tool across a variety of production 
conditions.  One conclusion apparent from the research shows models used to evaluate 
the tools have not focused on farm-level decision-making across Nebraska.  These 
models, either at a sector or farm level, established a baseline from which to build the 
representative farm model of Nebraska agriculture.  
 To design the representative farm model of Nebraska crop production, various 
yield and price parameters were necessary to simulate risk management tools and 
determine revenue distributions.  Chapter 3 reviewed the differences in size, cropping 
pattern, and productivity factors across different regions of Nebraska.  Differences in 
cropping practices across Nebraska correlate well with acreage and yield data of the 
NASS-ASDs.  These regions subdivide Nebraska’s 93 counties into eight areas.  Based 
upon the scope of the analysis, one representative farm was formulated for each NASS-
ASD where the size, cropping patterns, irrigation practices, and yield history reflect the 
average attributes of those found across counties lying in the region.     
 Yields simulated in the model included those at the national, state, district, 
county, and farm level.  Also, simulated prices reflect the deviation between the planting-
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and harvest-time average futures price.  To adjust for national or state MYA cash prices, 
a fixed basis was added to the simulated harvest-time prices.  Prices and yields in the 
model were correlated.  Using time-adjusted deviations from trend for key variables, the 
system of equations allowed for observed correlations to be maintained and modeled 
directly.   
 A correlation matrix involving national- and state-level variables served as the 
base for the simulation.  DAG procedures were used to analyze district yield deviations 
and regress yields off relevant state and district yields by cropping practice.  County 
yields were directly regressed off the simulated district yields.  Finally, a stochastic 
component using Miranda’s formula was added to the county yields to reflect average 
farm-level variability expressed in the representative county for each NASS-ASD.  
Through the base correlation matrix and series of regression equations, the representative 
farm model carried correlations through each level of aggregation.            
5.1.3 Summary of Strategies and Results 
 Previous literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identified the set of risk tools relevant to 
producers across Nebraska.  Besides introducing the simulation procedure, Chapter 3 
summarized the formation of the different strategies utilized in the different scenarios of 
the model.  The first scenario acts as the base strategy where each representative farm 
cash markets all grains produced at the simulated MYA price and does not participate in 
farm programs or crop insurance.  Four of the remaining scenarios utilized DCP while the 
other four selected ACRE as the government program choice.  Logically producers will 
participate in one of these two programs since these tools do not cost anything (not 
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counting program limits or participation costs) and provide guaranteed revenue through 
the DP. 
 Historical data showed two of the most popular crop insurance choices included 
RP and YP at the seventy-percent protection level.  Also, when coupling a novel hedge 
with crop insurance producers typically do not pre-price more than the APH guarantee.  
Combining the crop insurance and marketing strategies with the two government 
program choices led to a total of eight risk management strategies along with the base 
alternative not utilizing any of the various tools.  Table 3.3 summarized these nine 
scenarios.  After the formulation of these strategies, each scenario was simulated 500 
times with the same yield and price draws.    
 Chapter 4 analyzed these results with the EV, CV, SD, StopLight, and SERF 
procedures.  Each procedure had various advantages and disadvantages.  At the most the 
basic level the EV showed DCP-RP-CM was the optimal strategy for the representative 
farm in District 10, DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 
60, 70, 80, and 90.  One shortcoming of the EV technique was the inability to analyze the 
variability of the crop revenue.  CV took into consideration the variability of crop 
revenue in the analysis.  The CV technique found the DCP-RP-FH alternative was the 
optimal choice across all representative farms for an operation seeking the lowest level of 
relative variability in crop revenue.   
 Review of the CDF charts of each representative farm found that the SD would 
not provide consistent results or improve upon the EV or CV techniques.  Also, CDF 
charts showed most of the revenue distributions had a significant amount of overlap.  
StopLight charts improved on CV by taking into consideration not only the variability of 
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the representative farms’ revenue, but also the probability of achieving a certain level of 
revenue.  These levels can relate to producer risk preferences. 
 Benchmarks estimated with StopLight charts relate to the probability of being 
able to cover estimated variable and total costs related to crop production.  The optimal 
choice under this technique was the strategy which had the highest probability of 
covering total estimated expenses.  All of the representative farms except for District 50 
had DCP-RP-FH as the optimal strategy.  Once again, DCP-YP-FH was the most 
preferred scenario for the representative farm in district 50.  Besides the EV procedure 
assuming a risk-neutral producer attitude, all of the previous techniques assumed risk-
averse preferences when determining the optimal strategy. 
 SERF introduced the methodology to rank the performance of the risk 
management strategy across a variety of risk preferences ranging from neutral to 
extremely risk-averse.  Ranking the procedures to determine the optimal outcome showed 
DCP-RP-FH was the preferred alternative for the representative farms in most districts.    
In Districts 10 and 20, DCP-RP-CM and DCP-YP-FH were the optimal strategies 
respectfully.  Definite trends developed regarding the performance of the nine 
alternatives as the DCP-RP-FH alternative served as the most common choice, although 
outlier cases did exist.   
5.1.4 Implications for Producers on Management Decisions  
 Simulated risk management strategies reflected the alternatives available during 
the 2011 production year.  Yield and price expectations along with tools available in the 
future will change.  However, these results do provide insight for the upcoming 
production years and producer decision making.  Overall, except for the representative 
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farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50, the optimal scenario was DCP-RP-FH.  The results in 
these three districts are not consistent with the overall set, but producers in these areas 
would still choose participation in a government program involving DCP over ACRE.   
 Implications for Nebraska crop producers point to participation in DCP, RP, and 
FH as carrying the greatest benefits for reducing negative crop revenue variability.  
Regions in the western and central portions of Nebraska have unique yield and crop 
rotation attributes that may influence the performance of these various tools.  DCP 
outperforms ACRE due to current price and yield levels in comparison to program 
support levels.  Both programs would trigger support payments far below current 
expected price and yield levels.  While support payments are not expected, the 
guaranteed DP with DCP are higher than those under ACRE.  Also, assuming crop 
insurance rates are actuarially fair, producers should consider purchasing these products 
due to current subsidy levels.  Finally, FH versus only CM of the crop shows farm-level 
crop revenue experiences less variability by using futures.  This may also lead to 
producers experiencing margin calls in rapid upswings of prices.   
5.2 Areas of Future Research 
 Simulation results reflected the relevant combinations of government programs, 
crop insurance products, and marketing strategies available during the 2011 production 
year with correlated yield and price expectations.  These three broad categories will likely 
remain relevant to risk management strategies utilized by producers across Nebraska in 
the future.  Individual tools within these categories will probably evolve and progress 
over time to satisfy economic and production conditions of the period.  Future research 
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should focus on improving the performance of these products to better aid producers in 
dealing with declines in crop revenue.   
5.2.1 Future Production Years 
 Each production year, the set of risk management strategies should be 
reformulated to reflect available tools and simulated under current yield and price 
expectations.  The base yield and price parameters of each production year’s simulation 
may have a significant influence on the performance of various strategies.  Identifying 
these unique production attributes will be important for future producers in certain 
regions of the state to make good decisions.  Also, expanding the number of 
representative farms across Nebraska in the model would provide additional value to 
producers with more operations available for comparison.   
 Creating a producer-based decision interface which links to the representative 
farm model could aid producers in evaluating their individual risk management strategies.  
An interface that allows producers to input historical yields, parameters necessary for the 
various tools, and risk management strategies could be linked with the correlated model 
and produce simulation results reflecting actual farms.  Also, that process would carry 
through the respective correlations previously identified at larger yield or price 
aggregation levels to the individual producer’s operation.              
5.2.2 2012 Farm Bill Proposals and Beyond  
 Government farm program choices involving ACRE and DCP will only remain 
available through the 2012 production year.  Different interest groups and commodity 
organizations have proposed various farm program alternatives during the national debt 
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resolution debate of 2011 and the development of the 2012 Farm Bill.  Many of these 
program proposals would create a crop revenue safety net similar to ACRE, but without 
any DP or a state-wide trigger.  Some other proposals would still utilize a price support 
guarantee (Shields & Schnepf, 2011).  In either case, the design of the representative 
farm model can easily allow for the evaluation of these various revenue or price safety 
net proposals.  Simulation results provide insight on the design and resulting performance 
of government programs.        
5.2.3 Future Crop Insurance Policies 
 The role of crop insurance across Nebraska has evolved over time with the rise in 
commodity prices and increase in expected yields.  Also, depending upon the design of 
future farm programs, the relevance of crop insurance may increase even more.  Within 
each crop insurance policy are various levels of coverage.  Evaluating different strategies 
involving different levels of coverage may identify better combinations of the various 
tools.  Refinements to these products will also likely develop in the future.  As a pilot 
program during the 2012 production year, producers have the option to trend adjust their 
APH yields due to an average increase in the productivity of the major crops (USDA 
Risk Management Agency, 2011c).  This pilot program serves as an example of another 
relevant study to perform and analyze across the set of representative farms.   
5.2.4 Marketing Decisions 
 A multitude of marketing strategies exist involving futures, options, forward 
contracts, and cash sales.  Opportunities exist to study various combinations across the 
set of representative farms and interactions with other programs or products.  
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Understanding the motivation behind the placement and timing of marketing strategies 
poses another interesting question.  Also, developing a price set to reflect basis specific to 
a certain region of Nebraska during different periods of the marketing season would add 
further insight on marketing decisions across the state.   
5.3 Summary 
 Variability and productivity factors of Nebraska lead to unique farm-specific as 
well as wide-spread risk elements.  Risk management tools available to producers include 
government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing strategies.  Previous 
research did not completely define, combine, and simulate an appropriate set of risk 
management strategies relevant to different regions of Nebraska.  Results from this 
research of defined risk management strategies show selecting DCP as the government 
program choice, with a 70% RP crop insurance policy, and hedging 70% of the expected 
production provides the greatest benefit for the majority representative farms during the 
2011 production year.   
 Results from the simulation provide direction for future research.  Increasing the 
number of representative farms in the model or creating a user-based interface would 
allow producers to base decisions off more specific simulation results.  Proposals for 
farm programs beyond 2012 should be evaluated on the representative farm model to 
provide direction with policy development.  Pilot crop insurance programs may be 
another area to evaluate along with a multitude of marketing strategies.  All three of these 
risk management tools provide areas for further evaluation as policy and economic 
conditions evolve.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Reference Tables 
Table A.1 Representative Farm Simulation Summary Statistics for Alternative 
Scenarios 
District 10 
Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 604,574.20 644,894.21 641,226.06 643,533.15 639,865.00 640,624.49 636,956.34 639,263.43 635,595.29
StDev 160,866.02 133,579.07 127,017.63 137,026.24 130,387.63 133,467.39 126,961.85 136,895.14 130,309.95
CV 26.61 20.71 19.81 21.29 20.38 20.83 19.93 21.41 20.50
Min 68,516.84 406,772.62 394,831.70 382,369.98 386,203.54 402,341.69 390,400.77 377,939.05 381,772.61
Max 1,048,753.81 1,062,383.08 988,425.65 1,065,125.55 991,168.12 1,057,952.15 983,994.71 1,060,694.62 986,737.18
District 20 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 1,359,031.26 1,401,590.34 1,411,523.92 1,402,078.55 1,412,012.14 1,395,248.26 1,405,181.84 1,395,736.47 1,405,670.06
StDev 297,567.91 267,779.44 246,992.43 272,534.87 251,504.61 267,750.53 246,961.28 272,506.38 251,473.92
CV 21.90 19.11 17.50 19.44 17.81 19.19 17.58 19.52 17.89
Min 464,913.79 902,414.03 893,880.09 824,266.49 884,746.21 896,050.28 887,516.34 817,902.74 878,382.46
Max 2,129,762.99 2,146,513.45 1,955,441.38 2,151,003.64 1,959,931.57 2,140,149.70 1,949,077.63 2,144,639.89 1,953,567.82
District 30 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 1,007,462.83 1,032,496.72 1,036,303.04 1,031,480.02 1,035,286.34 1,028,682.18 1,032,488.49 1,027,665.48 1,031,471.79
StDev 176,336.44 164,773.97 149,036.96 167,245.37 151,016.14 164,639.73 148,901.38 167,108.79 150,877.55
CV 17.50 15.96 14.38 16.21 14.59 16.00 14.42 16.26 14.63
Min 491,627.03 655,714.24 677,650.01 620,167.19 676,267.34 651,830.44 673,766.21 616,283.39 672,383.54
Max 1,586,734.77 1,599,230.52 1,456,417.64 1,600,584.97 1,457,772.09 1,595,346.72 1,452,533.84 1,596,701.18 1,453,888.30
District 50 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 1,190,801.24 1,229,694.55 1,239,896.15 1,229,884.30 1,240,085.90 1,224,141.90 1,234,343.50 1,224,331.65 1,234,533.25
StDev 267,607.89 237,471.20 221,886.96 243,039.86 226,792.31 237,439.74 221,852.61 243,009.40 226,759.01
CV 22.47 19.31 17.90 19.76 18.29 19.40 17.97 19.85 18.37
Min 300,478.85 773,731.97 771,073.42 683,532.78 729,992.31 768,153.41 765,494.86 677,954.22 724,413.75
Max 1,746,749.47 1,804,378.49 1,655,036.96 1,800,512.00 1,659,479.42 1,798,799.93 1,649,458.40 1,794,933.44 1,653,900.86
District 60 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 900,449.03 935,832.61 939,096.12 933,758.48 937,021.99 931,514.74 934,778.25 929,440.60 932,704.12
StDev 155,902.96 138,566.56 124,525.43 142,237.35 127,234.48 138,509.05 124,456.29 142,179.68 127,164.98
CV 17.31 14.81 13.26 15.23 13.58 14.87 13.31 15.30 13.63
Min 501,945.98 656,542.69 649,949.42 567,290.26 635,955.01 652,169.59 645,576.32 562,917.17 631,581.91
Max 1,389,554.77 1,404,953.64 1,347,471.56 1,406,797.04 1,349,314.96 1,399,513.68 1,342,031.60 1,401,357.09 1,343,875.01
District 70 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 1,175,720.85 1,232,240.98 1,238,017.77 1,230,367.25 1,236,144.04 1,225,558.87 1,231,335.66 1,223,685.14 1,229,461.93
StDev 255,731.14 218,403.78 208,294.37 225,282.68 214,151.98 218,346.15 208,265.99 225,224.23 214,121.67
CV 21.75 17.72 16.82 18.31 17.32 17.82 16.91 18.41 17.42
Min 350,181.69 831,422.99 823,311.36 722,593.65 749,740.96 824,592.41 816,480.78 715,763.08 742,910.38
Max 1,842,281.21 1,860,427.75 1,749,523.53 1,865,040.18 1,754,135.96 1,853,597.17 1,742,692.95 1,858,209.60 1,747,305.38
District 80 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 1,136,409.57 1,172,855.88 1,177,523.96 1,172,099.30 1,176,767.38 1,167,120.24 1,171,788.31 1,166,363.65 1,171,031.73
StDev 190,419.26 173,980.89 158,577.09 177,595.53 161,552.23 173,947.44 158,557.42 177,562.93 161,533.11
CV 16.76 14.83 13.47 15.15 13.73 14.90 13.53 15.22 13.79
Min 589,762.08 775,717.32 795,179.11 665,343.20 795,235.96 769,925.48 789,387.27 659,551.36 789,444.12
Max 1,712,964.67 1,735,290.14 1,575,314.40 1,737,462.71 1,577,486.98 1,729,498.29 1,569,522.56 1,731,670.87 1,571,695.13
District 90 Farm 
Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean 946,216.15 988,837.68 991,511.49 986,874.59 989,548.40 984,143.49 986,817.30 982,180.40 984,854.21
StDev 171,326.46 150,511.96 139,801.61 153,323.40 141,956.85 150,452.28 139,743.81 153,262.01 141,896.91
CV 18.11 15.22 14.10 15.54 14.35 15.29 14.16 15.60 14.41
Min 399,432.37 642,955.23 662,057.97 630,413.36 649,516.10 638,162.31 657,265.05 625,620.44 644,723.18
Max 1,473,128.17 1,488,633.63 1,447,130.91 1,490,513.38 1,449,010.66 1,483,840.71 1,442,337.99 1,485,720.47 1,444,217.74
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
Risk Management Scenarios1
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.1 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 10 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.2 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 20 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.3 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 30 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.4 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 50 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.5 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 60 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.6 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 70 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.7 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 80 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure B.8 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 90 for 
Alternative Scenarios1   
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Figure C.1 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 10 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 249,543 Upper Cut-Off Value 539,213        
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
P(U)2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(C) 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24
P(F) 0.66 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.76
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.2 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 20 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 533,515 Upper Cut-Off Value 1,089,536
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
P(U)2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(C) 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
P(F) 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.3 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 30 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 352,428 Upper Cut-Off Value 796,831
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
P(U)2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(C) 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
P(F) 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.4 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 50 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 553,746 Upper Cut-Off Value 1,078,379
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P(C) 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.27
P(F) 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.73
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
0.01
0.32 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.27
0.67 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.73
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
  
 
113 
  
Figure C.5 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 60 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 311,692 Upper Cut-Off Value 711,338
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StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.6 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 70 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 699,198 Upper Cut-Off Value 1,131,710
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StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.7 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 80 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 562,166 Upper Cut-Off Value 1,051,547
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P(F) 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.74
StopLight Chart for Pr  
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.8 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 90 for Alternative Scenarios1   
Lower Cut-Off Value 408,343 Upper Cut-Off Value 855,988
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
2 P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
   P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
   P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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A
ppendix D
 Stochastic E
fficiency w
ith R
espect to a Function (SER
F) C
harts 
 
1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.1 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) in District 10 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.2 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 20 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.3 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 30 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.4 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 50 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.5 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 60 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.6 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 70 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.7 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 80 for 
Alternative Scenarios1  
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1 Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations. 
Figure D.8 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 90 for 
Alternative Scenarios1
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